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This is dedicated to my beloved father. Jack McGrath 
(1926 - 1992}. I finally got there dad!
It is also dedicated to all those employed in British 
breweries who over the past decade have been the 
victims of new strategies, but most especially for 
Trevor Stark.
Hilary Margaret Stark, B.A., M.A., P.G.C.E.
An Enquiry into the relations between the management and 
the workforce of Truman, Hanbury and Buxton in the 
inter-war period.
The purpose of this enquiry is to examine the 
nature of the working of the management of this 
particular brewery. A study is made of the the role of 
the management; the relationship that pertained between 
the Board of Directors and others employed within the 
brewery, both as managers and as workers; the working 
practices that existed within various sections of the 
company including the nature of career progression that 
was possible for mambers of the workforce and attitudes 
to trade unionism.
By studying these aspects of the operation of the 
brewery in the broader context of the ongoing debate 
about the nature of workplace relationships, it is 
demonstrated that the management were implementing two 
key strategies to control the labour force. These were 
paternalistic practices, modified by contemporary 
thinking about the nature of 'welfare work' and internal 
job ladders. What the work finds it impossible to 
demonstrate is the extent to which these strategies were 
being consciously implemented and it seeks to explain why 
it is hard to reach any firm conclusion.
CONTENTS
Page number
Chapter I - Introduction 3
{
Chapter II - The Setting 16
Chapter III - Management of the Brewery:
The Board of Directors 46
Chapter IV - Paternalism, Management and
the Workforce 60
Chapter V - Work of employed Management 91
Chapter VI - The Work of the Brewery 113
Chapter VII - Packaging the Product 140
Chapter VIII - Distributing the Product and
other work at the Brewery 161
Chapter IX - Conclusions 179
Appendix I - Numbers employed in the
Brewery in sample years 198
Appendix II - U.K. Drink Consumption per
Head, 1850 - 1914 199
Bibliography - 200
CHAPTER I •> INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this enquiry is to examine the 
work of one specific company, the brewers Truman, 
Hanbury and Buxton, in the inter-war period. This will 
involve a detailed study of the workings of both the 
management and the work processes of the brewery. In 
the course of this study an examination will be made, 
inter alia, of the role of the management, the
relationship between the Board of Directors, employed 
managers and the workforce, working practices, career
progression for employeees and attitudes to trade
unionism. It will become evident that two key 
strategies were in operation and that these aided the 
management in their control of the labour force. What 
is more problematical is the extent to which these two 
strategies were being consciously implemented by the 
management as an overt means of labour control.
In order to tackle the various issues that have 
been raised, the enquiry will be approached in the 
following way. Chapter II will establish a broad 
context for the material in terms of three aspects of 
the brewery. It will examine the geographical location 
of the brewery in the East End of London; it will 
examine the key developments in the brewing industry as 
a whole in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries; and it will examine the background to the 
development of this particular company from the late 
seventeenth century. Chapters III to V will examine
aspects of the management of the brewery, encompasssing 
the paternalistic traditions in which the company 
operated, the nature of the work performed, both by the 
family members and by the paid management and the 
relationships that existed between them. Chapters VI 
to VIII will, by following the production chain that 
takes place in the brewing of beer, indicate the work 
that was done by various groups within the brewery. The 
advantage of this approach is that it enables the 
actions of both the management and the workforce to be 
seen clearly and independently. The most obvious
drawback is the fact that management and workers do not 
operate independently; actions by one group will 
clearly impinge upon the other. The final chapter will 
therefore be concerned with integrating the findings in 
order to show how the workplace relations at Trumans 
may be used to elucidate some of the current debate 
about the nature of those relations.
In the past two decades, there has been a
proliferation of literature associated with the 
workplace and the relationships that have existed 
within it, seeking to explain the ways in which 
management has employed a variety of strategies beyond 
the simple cash nexus in order to exercise control over 
the labour force. This literature has revealed that the 
strategies employed by different industries, different 
firms within the same industry, and indeed, by the same
firm over a period of time, may well have varied
according to the particular amalgam of needs at any 
given point in time. As Gospel has pointed out, through 
the mechanism of strategic choice, management can, 
within certain constraints, determine the strategies 
that it pursues and the structural arrangements that it 
adopts. He further suggests that even where, through 
their actions, British employers may have given the 
impression that they were merely behaving in a reactive 
way to external pressures, this may not have been the 
case. By studying company structures over a longer 
period of time, it may reveal that employers carried 
out clearly defined strategies, even where such 
strategies were not being overtly articulated. (1) One 
purpose of this enquiry is to establish both the 
strategies that were employed by this particular 
company and the extent to which these strategies were 
being overtly pursued.
The two strategies that were in operation at 
Trumans, whether overtly or not, were the use of 
internal labour markets and the pursuit of 
paternalistic practices. It is therefore useful at tnis 
point to provide an elucidation of the issues 
associated with these strategies.
Littler (2) has suggested that different types of 
industrial production engendered different types of 
labour control. Process industries, with their
centralised organisation often gave rise to internal 
labour markets. One of the fundamental pre-conditions
for this type of control to occur was the existence of
a stable and on-going demand for the product in order
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to make it economically viable to train workers for 
promotion on an internal job ladder. The use of 
internal job ladders could benefit management in a
variety of different ways. These included the fact 
that they could be a way of extending employer control 
over the labour process; that they acted as a mechanism 
for reducing the leaving rate and that they operated as 
a method of protecting the firm's investment in 
training costs. In view of the nature of the type of 
firm that engendered this sort of form of labour
control, it is not especially surprising to find it 
operating within Trumans.
The traditional view of paternalism has been that 
it arose with the Industrial revolution in order to 
legitimise the authority of the factory owners, to 
establish a subordinate workforce and to instill the 
social mores of the ruling classes. A useful definition 
of this traditional view of the paternalistic 
relationship was offered by J.S. Mill in Principles of 
Political Economy:
"The relationship between rich and poor should be only 
partially authoritative; it should be amicable, moral 
and sentimental; affectionate tutelage on the one side, 
respectful and grateful deference on the other." (3) 
Roberts (4) has argued that from about the -middle of 
the nineteenth century, paternalism in this form began 
to break down as the consequence of the rise of laisser
6
faire individualism. Joyce, (5) on the other hand, has 
argued that the relationship between employer and 
employee was actually strengthened at this point by 
modifying its characteristics, most notably by 
establishing the mythology of the employer family which 
"worked in such a way as to make the appearances of a 
joint life-style and identity and of direct personal 
supervision and concern serve the purposes of their 
reality," (6) which most notably was the continuation 
of the deferential workforce. He does however concede 
that such practices had largely disappeared from the 
cotton industry with the advent of the larger concerns 
of the 1890s. In brewing, however, the notion of 
brewery welfare not only persisted, but was apparently 
strengthened by the advent of the 'Welfare Work' 
movement at the start of the twentieth century.
The notion of 'Welfare Work' appeared amidst a 
burgeoning interest in the sorts of strategies that 
employers could use to improve the efficiency of their 
enterprises. In many ways, it appeared to be a harking 
back to some of the central ideas of nineteenth century 
paternalism. As the Duke of York commented in 1923 on 
the founding of the Industrial Welfare Society: it
"enlarge(s) the old conception of the duty of the 
employer towards his workers as well as the 
responsibilities of the workers towards the employers." 
(7) Yet many contemporaries tried to present this as a 
new strategy operating in ways that were different from
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the old paternalistic relationship. Thus, E.D. Proud, 
in one of the most influential expositions of the ideas 
of the British movement, wrote that welfarism 
"emphasises the common human interests of all...permits 
and encourages recognition of the workers' attempts at 
self-help...emphasises personality, but merges 
individual interests into the common interests of 
all...a true solidarity of labour is fostered, though 
perhaps in a somewhat homely and restricted form." (8 
It is true that in two important respects 
welfarism differed from paternalism. There was a 
widespread feeling that non-wage money payments should 
not be made on an ex gratia basis because this smacked 
of charity and did not necessarily secure the future of 
the worker as such benefits would almost certainly be 
withdrawn by smaller employers at times of economic 
recession. Secondly, there was also a feeling that 
"the test of any scheme of factory organisation is the 
extent to which it creates and fosters the atmosphere * 
of co-operation and good will, without in any sense 
lessening the loyalty of the worker to his own class 
and organisations." (9) This latter feature would have 
been unlikely to have figured in nineteenth century 
views of paternalism. Yet, even if one can identify 
minor differences of emphasis between paternalism and 
welfarism, many of the motives underlying their 
implementation were in practice the same. For as Lloyd 
George pointed out in his introduction to Proud's book:
8
"beginning with a view mainly to the well-being of the 
employed, it gradually became evident that welfare 
supervision was equally beneficial to the employer." 
(10) Management utilised both paternalism and welfarism 
as a matter of "strategic choice" because its ultimate 
outcome helped them to achieve their objectives, 
although the emphasis of those objectives was likely to 
vary from industry to industry and company to company.
Jones has argued that for those employers 
engaged in welfarism, the "key motive...was the 
traditional one of promoting the tripod of efficiency; 
technical skill; health and discipline." (11) It is to 
an analysis of these three elements that attention will 
now be directed. The start of the twentieth century saw 
many changes for British employers. Staple industries 
needed to become more efficient in the face of foreign 
competition which was often organised on a corporate 
basis. Whilst brewing did not face such foreign 
competition, and indeed was actually strengthened by 
its control of its distribution and retail outlets, it 
too was under different types of pressure, caused by 
the economic conditions of the period. Such pressures 
were made more overt in the minds of the brewers by the 
vociferous agitations undertaken by the anti-drinks 
lobby. It seems likely then that brewing employers 
would have been interested in the contemporary debates 
on management strategy which were looking at more 
efficient methods of utilising the labour force.
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Welfarism was likely to strike a chord in the minds of 
the brewers in the sense that many of the practices 
being advocated would not have involved any new or 
radical departures, but would have justified existing 
practices in the jargon of the day. For example, 
"there can be little doubt that under a policy of this 
sort wisely carried out, a given sum of money will 
react more forcibly on the quality of the work people 
than it would do if simply handed over to the worker in 
the form of coin." (12) According to Jones, (13) those 
new industries of the 1930s that needed to attract a 
skilled labour force were particularly interested in 
welfare work schemes because they believed that this 
would stimulate the acquisition of the type of labour 
force they required. Equally, those companies that had 
spent some time training their workforce might use some 
type of welfare scheme in order to prevent a high, and 
more importantly, a costly, labour turn-over. Welfare 
provision could thus act as an incentive to remain 
within a company, facilitating the existence of 
internal labour markets within that firm.
The third element of Jones' "tripod" was that of 
health and discipline. This is clearly bound up with 
notions of efficiency, for the healthier and more 
disciplined a workforce, then clearly the more likely 
it was to be efficient. Health could be promoted in a 
variety of ways: making sports provision available
(which could simultaneously serve other purposes,
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including the creation of a team spirit which might be 
transferred to the workplace; the sublimation of 
potential social conflict between employer and 
employee; free publicity in the local press should the 
team achieve some degree of success); providing canteen 
facilities for both breakfast and lunch, where the 
worker was likely to pay the full economic cost of the 
food, but the employer would probably underwrite the 
costs of running the facility; providing some element 
of medical care which might be preventative (inspection 
by company doctors, vaccination on site) or curative 
(hospital treatment or convalescence).
It is clear that some employers were using 
welfare schemes as an overt means of exercising control 
over their labour force. Melling, (14) for example, by 
drawing on the engineering industry, has shown that in 
that sector, welfarism was a conscious strategy 
designed by employers to gain control of the workplace 
whilst simultaneously demonstrating the legitimacy of 
their situation. This interpretation has found support 
in Lewchuk's study of British car employers, where he 
suggests that their use of consultation, a typical 
element of welfare schemes, was merely a device to 
legitimise control, rather than a real sharing of the 
decision-making process. (15) This is, in point of 
fact, a view that may be found reflected in the 
comments of contemporary employers; Rowntree, for 
example, argued that "those who accept ultimate
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financial liability must retain ultimate 
responsibility." (16) Welfarism might also be used as a 
means of circumventing and undercutting trade union 
activity. Waller (17) has indicated its use in this way 
in the collieries, whilst Reader (18) has shown that 
although ICI in the 1920s did not act in this ‘ way as 
the consequence of a conscious strategy decision, when 
they became aware that it was having this effect, they 
deemed it a successful policy.
Hannah, (19) on the other hand, has suggested 
that many companies were pursuing welfare schemes 
without any clear realisation that these provisions 
could be used as an overt strategy of management 
control over the workplace. Rather, many saw it in 
vague terms as something that might possibly increase 
worker loyalty and therefore have some ill-defined 
advantage for them.
There were thus a potentially wide and complex 
variety of motives that impinged on employers, not just 
in different industries, nor even in different 
companies, but even in the same company over a period 
of time. Some motives were overt and clearly
articulated, others were vague and rather ill-defined. 
It might be argued that what all shared was ultimately 
the desire to maintain productivity and profitability. 
Yet this type of argument oversimplifies the very real 
conflict that was apparantly experienced by some 
employers, such as those associated with the Quaker
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ethos, as parts of the founding families of Trumans 
were. It seems likely that intertwined with more 
conventional attitudes towards the motives of 
management, there was some degree of altruism, some 
"genuine feeling for the rights of workers and a real 
commitment to fair dealing in employment contracts." 
(20) Such an action almost certainly arose out of the 
need to legitimise their business actions in order to 
resolve an inherent conflict with their religious 
values and beliefs. It must not be forgotten though, 
that brewers who did not share these values and beliefs 
had reached similar conclusions about the efficacy of 
implementing welfare schemes. This suggests that 
welfarist strategies, whilst coinciding with a 
particular ethos, were also a highly effective means of 
achieving a variety of ends.
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CHAPTER II - THE SETTING 
I - London's East End
The brewery founded by Benjamin Truman in 1666 is 
located in Brick Lane. It is bounded on the south by 
the Commercial Road and on the north by the Old Nichol, 
an area whose character has been committed to fiction 
by Arthur Morrison's A Child of the Jaao. and more 
recently been revealed by Raphael Samuel's interviews 
with Arthur Harding. The brewery thus lies in the heart 
of the East End, an area whose deprivations and 
depravities have exercised a fascination for 
contemporary observers since the early nineteenth 
century. These have contributed to the creation of the 
popular stereotypes and images of this part of London. 
Booth's survey suggested that in 1887, 35 per cent of 
the population of Tower Hamlets were living below the 
poverty line, including 13 per cent who were
"chronically distressed." (1) It was the poverty
stricken conditions of this group that gave rise to the
types of description that many came to apply to the
East End as a whole. One example of this, in the type 
of extravagant terms that typified the period, is this 
account by W. Mearns:
the poor have been growing poorer, the 
wretched more miserable and the immoral 
more corrupt.... Few who will read these 
pages have any conception of what these
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pestilential rookeries are.... To get to 
I them you have to penetrate courts 
seeking with malodorous gases...you have 
to grope your way along dark and filthy 
passages swarming with vermin... then you 
may gain admittance to the dens in which 
these thousands of beings herd together. (2)
A further example of this type of writing, which refers 
specifically to Brick Lane is this account by J.H. 
MacKay:
Whoever has once slowly sauntered 
through Brick Lane can say that he has 
been grazed by the pestilential breath 
of want; whoever has gone astray in its 
side streets has walked along the edge 
of the abyss of human suffering. Whoever 
would like to see how much human nature 
can endure...let him visit the battle 
field of Brick Lane, where men do not 
fall with skulls cracked and hearts shot 
through, but where hunger cuts them down 
easily after want has deprived them of 
their last force of resistance. (3)
Such images of the East End are legion. This 
inherent poverty came to be seen by many as a 
consequence of the perceived industrial structure of 
the area. Walter Besant, for example, in interpreting 
Booth's figures, suggested that as much as 75 per cent
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of the East End's workforce were casually employed. 
(4.) It has recently been argued by Southall (5) that 
such a concentration on the problems of London ware 
misplaced. Contempories assumed that London's problems 
were worse than those being experienced in the 
provinces and focused their attentions accordingly. 
Using statistical data from a variety of sources, such 
as trade union records and National Insurance records, 
Southall has concluded that although London's 
unemployment was marginally worse than that which 
existed in its immediate hinterland, it was nonetheless 
substantially lower than that which pertained in the 
North. Despite such recent modifications in 
interpretation, the focus of the plethora of literature 
that exists on London and its labour market 
concentrates upon the poorest elements of the East 
End.
It has been suggested that casual labour arose as 
London's response to an increasing demand that had been 
engendered by a growth in population. Instead of 
responding to this by developing a factory system among 
London's established industries, it led to the 
sub-division of production, using simple and 
comparatively inexpensive hand-driven machinery, where 
appropriate. This also had the advantage that producers 
were able to respond rapidly to changes in style, 
whether in clothing, footwear or furniture. This type 
of labour market made it possible largely to dispense
18
with skilled labour and carry out production in small 
workshops or in the home. This was a necessary aspect 
of the system as the sub-contractors often worked on 
very small margins of capital investment: Mayhew, for
example, pointed to the furniture makers who needed to 
sell the goods already produced in order to buy the 
materials to make the next item. (6) Once the technical 
problems had been solved, however, and the conditions 
of mass demand for cheap ready-made goods had been 
established, manufacturers were able to take advantage 
of a cheap over-filled labour pool, an important 
element of which was women and immigrants, who were 
prepared to work for subsistence wages.
Women were attracted to this labour pool because 
of a lack of skills, generally combined with reduced 
circumstances, such as might be occasioned by the 
illness, death, unemployment or underemployment of a 
husband. In 1907, over 50 per cent of women employed 
working in their own homes in the clothing trade of 
West Ham were the wives of men in casual employment, 
such as builders, general labourers and dock labourers. 
(7) Arriving immigrants were likely to be attracted to 
areas where fellow immigrants had already settled 
because this would provide them with a secure social 
network. Thus, in the late nineteenth century, Jewish 
immigrants would come to the East End because earlier 
immigrants had already settled there, some of them 
having developed their own small-scale units of
19
production. For many immigrants, this would provide 
their point of entry into the sweated trades.
It was this external sub-contract of the sweated 
trades and the attempts by various groups of workers, 
such as the Jewish tailors in 1907, to overthrow this 
system of control that have provided the central themes 
for many historians studying the labour markets of the 
East End. Yet at the start of the nineteenth century, 
it had not been inevitable that this was the type of 
industrial production that London would develop, for it 
was in the East End that "the new processes of large 
scale production with the use of power were taking 
root: Stepney then had its large breweries,
distilleries, sailcloth factories, glass houses and 
sugar refineries." (8) It can be argued that the system 
of casual and sweated labour dated from the opening of 
the new London docks in 1805, which attracted many 
small industries to occupy the open land of the 
district. In turn, the existence of a number of small 
industries in the area attracted a labour force, which 
although initially containing a skilled element, would 
by the later nineteenth century, have become the 
sweated workforce through a process of the sub-division 
of labour which would lead to de-skilling. Bedarida has 
clearly identified a pattern of development taking 
place in Poplar (9) which shares a number of common 
features with this general pattern. Until 1800, this 
district was predominantly rural with the only large
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employer being the Blackwall shipyard. Following the 
opening of the West India Docks in 1802, the population 
quintupled in the period to 1840 during which time a 
number of factories were opened on the poorer land of 
the district. Whilst there continued to be 
opportunities for skilled employment, such as metal 
work and engineering, there was also an extensive 
casual labour market, both in the hew factories such as 
jam and in transport.
By the end of the nineteenth century, casual and 
sweated labour had emerged as the norm for many of 
those employed in the East End, but the large-scale 
enterprises which had been typical of the start of the 
century had not disappeared, but had continued to 
operate and provide employment for many East Enders; a 
jute factory in Stratford-le-Bow employed one thousand 
workers, Samuda Brothers, iron ship builders employed a 
similar number of permanent workers and a further 
thousand casual workers, whilst Trumans, who were a 
capital-intensive rather than a labour-intensive 
operation, nonetheless had a workforce of four hundred 
and fifty employees. (10) Indeed, the scale of brewing 
in London, led George Dodd to comment that "the London 
porter breweries...are among the lions of the 
Metropolis; so vast are their dimensions, their 
vessels, their plans of operations and the capital 
invested." (11) And of these 'lions' Trumans was in the 
first rank. It was consistently the largest of the East
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End breweries (the others being Mann, Crossman and 
Paulin, Red Lion and Taylor Walker). It was the third 
largest of all the London breweries in the early 
nineteenth century, and for a short period in the 1870s 
it was the largest London brewer.
East End employment can therefore be seen to be 
substantially more diverse than traditional approaches 
might suggest. This is confirmed in Bedarida's findings 
in which he suggests that a "remarkable feature" of 
Poplar was "its combination of large factories and 
small workshops." (12) Such a combination, both in 
Poplar and elsewhere in the East End meant that there 
existed in London, labour markets other than those that 
characterised the sweated and casual trades. This view 
is confirmed thus by Bedarida: "To insist on the 
metropolis being dominated by small businesses is to 
miss the considerable part played by some large and 
medium-scale concentrated enterprises." (13) These 
workplaces would produce patterns of employment and 
control as distinctive as any exhibited in the more 
'typical' London trades, as this enquiry into the 
nature of employment at a specific London brewery seeks 
to demonstrate.
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II - Brewing in the late nineteenth century
In 1699, there were 194 common brewers in London 
(14), many of whom were producing beer in a 
semi-domestic fashion, frequently for consumption on 
their own premises. In the course of the eighteenth 
century, whilst the number of brewers declined, the
scale of operations of those remaining increased. The
reasons for this change was that brewing was
"technologically very suited for large scale production 
within the single plant" (15) and that it did not 
require new forms of power or transport improvements to 
provide the impetus for such an industrial take-off. 
Once such improvements had occurred and demonstrated 
their worth, however, the industry was generally 
prepared to make use of them. Trumans was to prove 
absolutely typical in this respect, rarely being at the 
forefront of innovation, but frequently following in 
its slipstream. The process of change was encouraged 
throughout the century by the continued demand for 
beer. (See Appendix II, footnote 16)
The latter part of the nineteenth century saw 
four major developments that were to have subsequent 
repercussions on the industry in the inter-war period: 
technical innovation, changes in management techniques, 
the 'Brewery Wars' and government legislation. This 
section will examine each of these developments as they 
affected the industry in general.
Technical innovation had been taking place since
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the start of the nineteenth century. London brewers had 
been among the first of Boulton and Watt's customers, 
with Trumans acquiring a steam engine relatively late 
in the day in 1805. Brewers were quick too, to see the 
opportunities offered by refrigeration, which freed 
them from the constraints of having to produce at fixed 
volumes and enabled them to store beers in special 
cellars; by 1889, Trumans had five ether and one 
ammonia type of refrigerating machines. Other machines 
that came to be widely used in this period included 
Steel's mashing machine of 1853 and Robert's sparging 
machine of 1869. Advances were made too in the bottling 
of beer, which gradually came to be fully mechanised on 
the conveyer belt principle. By 1905, the principal 
method for bottling involved the production of 
carbonated beer by exerting the artificial pressure of 
carbonic acid gas on a chilled and filtered beer. This 
proved to be both economical and efficient; 
particularly important in bottling as the margin of 
profit was low. Further improvements were made by the 
employment of chemists to analyse problems in the beer 
making process; these included advances in the types of 
yeast used, the varieties of barley grown and in the 
sorts of cheaper substitutes that could be used in all 
areas of the brewing process.
The employment of chemists to achieve both 
economies and a better end product indicate a growing 
awareness of the need to utilise specialists where
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appropriate. That such specialists should have the 
proper training was also becoming accepted practice 
amongst the brewing employers. Thus in 1895, members of 
the Yorkshire Institute of Brewers were told that the 
days had long gone when a brewery could be regarded as 
the "last resource for a young man when having failed 
for the Army, the Church or one of the learned 
professions, his premium is paid and he is shipped off 
to some pupil-taking brewery with the idea that at
least we can make a brewer of him." (17) Such a
recognition of the need for proper training was not 
merely discussed by the brewers, but was also put
effectively into practice. Birmingham brewers, for
example, endowed the British School of Malting and
Brewing at Birmingham University in 1900.
Specialists were used not just in the brewing
processes, but in a wide variety of functions, 
including, for example, designing the layout of the 
plant in order to optimise output. Such a role would 
have been particularly important at Trumans where some 
of the brewery's work was still carried out in
buildings that had been erected in the seventeenth 
century and much of the other work was carried out in 
buildings that had been developed in an ad hoc way 
since that time. It was not until the first half of the 
1920s that an organised building programme was
instituted, and even this was to find itself quickly 
outmoded as the brewery abandoned horse drays for mptor
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transport. There was thus a new emphasis on the ability
of management to have a close working knowledge of the
{
scientific basis of management, or at the very least, 
to employ someone who did. This was not, however, to be 
implemented in such a way that it would lead to a more 
"professional" form of management that would tend to 
reduce the influence of the Board of Directors.
The 1880s saw the beginning of a move to float 
breweries on the Stock Exchange. By 1890, more than two 
hundred breweries had been floated, whilst between 1886 
and 1900, £185 million pounds worth of brewing shares
had been issued. (18) Such fundamental financial 
readjustments within the industry were clearly going to 
have many far-reaching effects, of which the reduction 
in the number of breweries by 42.9 per cent from 11,322 
to 6,460 is perhaps the most striking. (19) Briefly, 
the way in which the 'Brewery Wars' led to this outcome 
was that after flotation, even relatively small 
breweries were likely to have a reasonable amount of 
capital for expenditure. There were two main 
possibilities for the use of this capital; one was to 
expand the scale of production, the other was to expand 
the potential retail outlet of. the product. The latter 
course appeared to be a particularly attractive one to 
many breweries. In a period of growing population, the 
number of licenses were actually diminishing: from
104,792 in 1886 to 98,742 in 1906. (20) Despite the 
improvements in refrigeration, beer still had a limited
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lifespan and demand could best be gauged if the brewer 
had control of his outlets. Such control would also 
enable the brewer to protect his own branded products 
and prevent the possibility of a discount war.
The larger London breweries had utilised the loan 
tie system from a fairly early date. This had involved 
them in lending money to an independent publican in 
return for the right to be that publican's sole 
supplier. By the mid 1880s this system was under 
threat: Burton brewers with their distinctive pale ale 
that could not be brewed in London because of the high 
carbonate and low sulphate content of the capital's 
water supply, had penetrated the London market. This 
threat was exacerbated still further by a decline in 
the per capita consumption of beer. Nonetheless, in the 
early years after flotation, the large London brewers 
do not appear to have used their capital to purchase 
public houses on long leases: Trumans, for example, had 
215 tied houses in 1890, but only an additional four by 
1892. From 1892, the situation changed, with London 
brewers becoming increasingly aware of the advantages 
of owning tied property, with prices of these reaching 
very high levels for at least a decade as a result. 
This in its turn created problems for some companies. 
As E.N. Buxton was to remark in his evidence to the 
Royal Commission on Liquor Licensing in 1897:
a very great change has taken place in the 
last five years. Probably some one or two
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firms endeavoured to increase their trade 
at the expense of others. Naturally every 
company tries to protect itself, and at 
least to save its own trade, and any firm 
which has not done so in the last five 
years would certainly have gone to the 
wall. (21)
Prices only really began to slow down again after the 
1909 Budget, which depreciated the values of licensed 
properties, but by that time, according to Monckton, 95 
per cent of all premises had become tied.
Two factors in this process led to a decline in 
the number of breweries. Firstly, once the price of 
acquiring tied property had begun to rise, smaller 
breweries could no longer compete, and were thus 
excluded from this avenue of ensuring an outlet for 
their product. Even if some tied property had been 
bought, it was likely to have been at inflated prices, 
and even for some of the big companies could imvolve a 
financial loss. As Cosmo Bonsor of Watney, Combe and 
Reid commented in 1904:
This company carried on practically two 
businesses. They were manufacturers and 
sellers of beer. This part of their business 
was as good as ever. It was the other 
portion of the business in which they dealt 
in the securities of licensed houses, that 
the losses came from. (23)
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Secondly, once there were effectively no more tied 
houses to be purchased nor any further prime sites to 
be developed, the only way for a brewery to enlarge its 
scale of operations was through mergers. This usually 
proved to be a larger firm buying up a smaller firm and 
in the process, acquiring its tied outlets, but on 
occasion, was smaller firms coming together to protect 
themselves in an increasingly competitive market. Thus, 
the battle to acquire outlets and the financial 
problems that this engendered for both large and small 
London brewers was precipitated by the flotations of 
the 188 0s, but was to fundamentally affect the 
financial structure of the breweries well into the 
twentieth century.
Many nineteenth century commentators saw alcohol 
as "almost the exclusive cause of such ills as
pauperism, insanity and crime," (24) whilst in 1915, 
Lloyd George felt impelled to suggest that "drink is 
doing us more damage than all the German submarines put 
together." (25) The contemporary brewing industry 
perceived the legislative activity that such views gave 
rise to as being yet one further factor in the variety 
of problems that had to be dealt with. Gourvish and
Wilson (26) have shown that the significance of this in
restricting the profitability of the industry was
exagerrated at the time. Nonetheless, certain aspects 
of wartime controls were to continue to have an effect 
on the post-war industry. Following the Compulsory
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Dilution Order of 1916 post-war levels of gravity would 
never again match pre-war levels. More importantly, the 
rising cost per unit of production caused by falling 
output imposed on the industry in order to release land 
from hop and barley growing for more essential foods, 
reinforced by wartime exigencies such as the 
requisitioning of lorries and the shortage of 
man-power, exacerbated the problems already being faced 
by the less efficient companies. This led to a further 
wave of mergers as the larger companies took advantage 
of the situation to consolidate their market position. 
One further side-effect of the war was that via the 
Carlisle experiment, it had been shown that the 
provision of amenities such as entertainment and 
recreation, far from encouraging drunkenness, as the 
scheme's detractors had anticipated, actually 
encouraged better behaviour. In the post-war period, 
this was to be translated by the brewery companies into 
a positive attempt to make many improvements to 
licensed premises in order to broaden their appeal to a 
wider clientele.
It can therefore be seen that in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were 
significant developments in a wide variety of areas 
that impinged oh the conduct and policies of brewery 
companies. Both the direct and the indirect effects of 
these developments continued to exercise their 
influence in the inter-war period.
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Ill - The Firm
While optimists may attempt to trace the origins 
of Trumans back to 1381 when a brewer by the name of 
William Truman attacked the Lord Mayor of London during 
Wat Tyler's revolt and traditionalists accept the 
references made in a nineteenth century letter to lost 
business papers which showed the brewery to be 
established in 1666, the first concrete evidence of a 
brewery on the Brick Lane site dates from 1683. In that 
year, Joseph Truman appeared in the register of St. 
Dunstan's Church as 'brewer of brick lane' (sic). It is 
not clear if Joseph Truman owned the brewery from the 
onset or if he was simply an employee of William 
Bucknall who owned the land on which it was built. 
Certainly, at some point before 1690, possibly on 
Bucknall's death in 1679, he had come into possession 
of a brew house, for in that year he was fined by the 
Brewer's Company for being an interloper, who was 
brewing while not a member of the company. This 
situation he subsequently rectified. ■
Among a number of partners in the enterprises, it 
was one of Joseph's sons, Benjamin, who was to prove 
the most active and the most astute. Traditional 
accounts of the history of the company also suggest 
that good fortune played an importany role, pointing to 
a story published in Coleman's Manners and Customs i.n 
London in the Eighteenth Century. One such source'for 
this account is to be found in the company's
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tricentennial publication•
When the Duchess of Brunswick was b o m  in 
1737, the Prince of Wales ordered four 
loads of faggots and a number of tar 
barrels to be burned before Carlton House 
to celebrate the event and directed the 
Brewer to his household to place four 
barrels of beer near it for those who 
chose to partake of the beverage which 
certain individuals had no sooner done 
than they pronounced the liquid of 
inferior quality.
This declaration caused a riot: the beer was thrown by
the crowd over each other and the barrels were thrown 
onto the bonfire. To calm the situation down, the 
Prince declared that additional celebrations would be 
held on the following night, but on this occasion the 
beer was obtained from Trumans, which led Coleman to 
observe that "the populace was pleased and satisfied" 
with this alternative." (27) Trumans had thus obtained 
a royal seal of approval.
Such lucky stories apart, the period in which 
Benjamin Truman was at the head of the company was one 
of expansion and consolidation for the brewery. He 
acquired new properties and leases for his products; he 
introduced the brewing of porter to the company, which 
was to have long-term implications. Porter could be 
brewed on a much larger scale than the type of ale that
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the company had been producing hitherto because it did 
not ' deteriorate so rapidly. In order to achieve the 
maximum scale of production that was possible, the 
Brick Lane site had to be redesigned. This more 
effective layout would enable the company to be 
producing 60,000 barrels of porter a year by 1760, 
making it the third largest London brewer, and would 
provide the basis on which future expansion could take 
place.
In recognition of his role as a leading London 
businessman, Benjamin Truman was knighted on the 
accession of George III in 1760. By the time of his 
death in 1780, his only son had predeceased him and his 
daughter's two sons showed little interest in the 
family business. In consequence, he left a 
one-eighteenth share in the brewery to his grandson 
William Truman Read, but the bulk of his £180,000 
estate, together with a share of seventeen-eighteenths 
in the brewery, he left in trust to the sons of his 
granddaughter, Frances Read Villebois, To execute the 
will and oversee the running of the brewery, he 
appointed his Head Clerk, James Grant, who was to 
fulfill this role for ten years, in which period he 
acquired William Truman Read's share. On his death this 
share was sold to Sampson Hanbury, who took over the 
running of the day to day affairs of the brewery. This 
position he filled until his death forty-six years 
later, building up his share-holding from
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one-eighteenth to one-third in this period with 
Benjamin Truman's two grandsons remaining as sleeping 
partners throughout. Like Benjamin Truman, Sampson 
Hanbury had no direct male heirs, so before his death 
he brought his nephew, Thomas Fowell Buxton into the 
firm in 1808, making him a partner in 1811 with two 
shares. This then completed the triumverate of names by 
which the company was to be known: Truman, Hanbury and 
Buxton.
These latter two families were to bring more than 
just capital and effective management to the company: 
they would also imbue it with their own religious and 
political ethos. By the late nineteenth century, "the 
brewer wealth-holders were as homogeneous as any group 
of wealth-holders," (28) with the basis of that 
homogeneity being membership of the Anglican church and 
Conservative politics. By contrast, the Hanburys tended 
to be mainly Quaker in persuasion, whilst the Buxtons 
were more likely to be evangelical, although they 
showed much sympathy for the Quaker perspective. 
Indeed, Thomas Fowell Buxton married Hannah Gurney, one 
of the Earlham Gurneys whom he had known from the age 
of fifteen. He himself wrote of his links with this 
well-known Quaker family: "I know of no blessing of a
temporal nature (and it is not only temporal) for which 
I ought to render so many thanks as my connexion with 
the Earlham family. It has given colour to my life. Its 
influence was most positive and pregnant with good."
34
(29) This influence encouraged him to devote much of 
his time and energy to working for the unfortunate; he 
was the 'Slave Liberator' who saw Wilberforce's work 
through to its logical conclusion; he gave freely to 
charities such as the London Hospital and contributed 
generously to ease the plight of the Spitalfields 
weavers. He thus "early set the well known tradition of 
the Black Eagle Brewery for unostentatious philanthropy 
and charitable benevolence," (30) which would be 
pursued by both the Buxtons and the Hanburys over the 
following decades. Such an ethos was evident too in the 
attitudes that existed towards those who were employed 
in the brewery. In view of the evident divergence 
between these families and that of the majority of 
brewery owners, it is vital to establish the extent to 
which it was the process or the family background that 
determined the methods of management that were 
implemented.
The completion of the name by which the company 
was to be known did not however complete the families 
who were to comprise the ownership of the company. The 
fourth and final element of the brewery were the Pryors 
of Shoreditch. In 1816, their lease on Proctor's 
Brewery lapsed and they sought to invest their capital 
and knowledge in another brewery. In Hanbury's words: 
"From particular family connections with Buxton and me, 
both they and their friends are extremely desirous of 
engaging them with us...they can bring trade with them,
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which is about 20,00 barrels - they will add capital." 
(31) Thus, by 1816, the basic infrastructure of the 
company had been laid down, with the founding family of 
Truman effectively playing no further role in the 
management of the company.
There were two other developments in the 
nineteenth century that ought, at this point, to be 
noted. .Firstly, in 1839, the railways reached Burton.. 
This enabled the penetration of their light sparkling 
ale into other parts of the country. If a London brewer 
wanted to produce Burton ale, it had to acquire a 
Burton brewery and this Trumans did in 1873, quickly 
making a success of it. By 1880, it was amongst the 
group of five brewers who ranked in size behind the 
dominant two in the town and was employing more than 
one hundred and seventy workers. (32) The second 
development came in the 1880s; like so many other 
breweries at this time, the company decided to float 
itself on the Stock Exchange as a limited liability 
company. Having discussed the possibility of doing this 
during the course of 1888, the company was formally 
registered in 1889. Its authorised capital issue was 
£1,850,000. The three families took up the ordinary and 
preferred ordinary share issue of £1,315,000, with 
6,175 shares going to the Buxtons, 3,650 to the 
Hanburys and 2,325 to the Pryors. Ownership of the 
shares gave the owner the right to vote at shareholders 
meetings on issues that affected their rights, being
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possessed of one vote per £10 of capital. In addition 
to the share issue, there was also a debenture issue of 
which one-third, amounting to £400,000, remained in the 
hands of the three families.
In practice, the flotation made very little 
difference to the structure of management of the firm. 
The erstwhile partners of the company became the new 
Board of Directors and the Senior Partner, Arthur 
Pryor, became the Chairman of the Board of Directors. 
Indeed, it was 1954 before a Director was appointed who 
came from outside the three families and their 
immediate descendants. Even when this did occur, the 
individual concerned, H. Malien, had already been the 
General Manager of the company for the not 
inconsiderable period of twenty-five years. Such 
continuity of management was not confined to Trumans, 
but was widespread throughout brewing, as Chandler has 
pointed out. "Although most breweries were incorporated 
they continued to be run as partnerships." (33) What 
the flotation and a subsequent debenture issue in 1897 
did do, was to provide the company with increased 
capital. By 1901, £3 million had been invested in 
property in order to maintain the company's trading 
position. In view of the fact that such property assets 
were included as part of the calculation in determining 
the market value of shares, it is not surprising that 
Trumans consistently figured in the index of the top 
two hundred industrial enterprises in Great Britain. In
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1919, Trumans was listed at number 133 with £1.7 
million; in 1930, it was listed at number 77 with £4.6 
million and in 1948 at number 92 with £8.8 million. For 
the two earlier years, this meant that it was the 
sixteenth most valuable brewery in the country, rising 




The principal contemporary sources that have been
i
used in this study are the company records of Truman 
Hanbury and Buxton which are lodged at the Greater 
London Record Office under the care of Ms. Harriet 
Keneally, whose support and co-operation were 
invaluable in the course of this research.The records 
have not, as yet, been catalogued, and therefore great 
reliance had to be place on Ms. Keneally's. knowledge of 
the archives. Among the sources consulted were the 
following items: Monthly Reports 1908 - 38, Clerks
salaries and Rest expenses 1898 - 1932, Clerks
agreements 1914 - 37, Thursday memoranda 1915 -r 25,
Black Eagle 1929 - 35, together with some post-war
editions, which provided eulogies for long serving 
employees and obituaries of those who had been long 
serving employees, even if they had retired before 
their deaths, personal correspondence folder, letters 
book 1914 - 27, Directors Orders books for Stenhouse
and Smith, Expense book 1930 - 32, Main ledger 1930 - 
40, Rest book 1906 - 43, Dissection book 1927 - 33,
Rest expense memo 1852 - 1952, Pensions and gratuities
1919 - 30, Workmens' presents 1910 - 23, 1924 - 30 and
1931 - 39, Brewers' men 1920 - 39, Draymen's wages
summary 1901 - 21, Draymen 1907 - 11, 1920 - 35,
Draymen's wages book 1904 - 19, wages book 1917 - 20,
Savings bank ledger 1908 - 26, 1927 - 46. The other
principal contemporary source that was consulted were
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the Directors' Minutes Books, which at the time of use 
were still housed at the Brewery at Brick Lane; my 
thanks for access to these and for providing an office 
to peruse them over a number of weeks goes to John 
Baker, a former Personnel Director with the company.
It is clear from the list presented in the 
previous paragraph that a wealth of records relating to 
this company have survived, but their use has posed 
certain problems. Firstly, many of them were simply 
financial accounts with little or no explanation as to 
what the figures related to. This type of source could 
not effectively be used in this enquiry. Secondly, none 
of the sources used made any explicit reference to the 
key areas that this enquiry is focused upon. For those 
associated with the brewery, it seems likely that such 
issues were implicitly understood by all those 
involved. As Chandler has pointed out, even among the 
largest British companies, where they were controlled 
by family members, "working closely together at the 
office in or near the plant...they had little need for 
charts and tables to define and explain their 
organisation to themselves or others." (35) However, 
for the historian trying to reconstruct hierarchies, 
attitudes and patterns of behaviour, conclusions can 
only be inferred on the basis of the implicit evidence 
provided. Thirdly, there were gaps within the sources. 
This could be in terms of missing years within longer 
runs of material, such as Draymen 1912 - 19 or in
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apparent gaps for entire sections of the brewery. There 
is, for example, no separate material on either the 
Transport department or the Wharf, although the latter 
may have maintained separate records that were never 
passed over to the main brewery. In any event, any 
conclusions drawn about either of these departments are 
based on references made to them in other materials, 
which may very well present them from the perspective 
of that department, rather than in their own light. 
Another significant gap seems to be the Directors 
Orders books. As there were five heads of department 
and as two of these men had such a book, it seems to be 
a reasonable assumption to make that all five men 
possessed their own copy. The two surviving books 
outline general brewer policy, but they also include 
specific issues that impinge on the working of the 
particular department. Fourthly, all of these records 
are 'official' records; issues are explored exclusively 
from the perspective of the management and the reaction 
of the workforce to the decisions that affect them is 
virtually always presented in deferential terms, such 
as the letter sent by twenty of the company's Foremen: 
Dear Mr. Gerald,
will you please convey to the shareholders 
and accept yourself this expression of our 
sincere and grateful thanks, for promise of 
an extra week's wages and also the assurance ' 
of our determined endeavour to keep on the
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prosperity of the good old firm of THB & Co.
' through good times or bad. (36)
Whilst it seems likely that such emotions were 
genuinely held, it seems totally improbable that they 
were the only form of response ever exhibited by the 
workforce. Yet even when strike activity is being 
reported, the manner of the workforce is presented in 
the most deferential of terms. Such problems must be 
borne in mind when utilising the materials, yet the 
sheer amount that has survived, not just from the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but from the 
beginning of the brewery in the seventeenth century, 
makes the archive at the Greater London record Office 
an important source for any historian interested in 
examining the development and management of a 
successful London brewery.
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CHAPTER III - MANAGEMENT OF THE BREWERY:
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
As has already been indicated, the flotation of 
the company in 1889 changed the terminology associated 
with the management, but not the essential structures 
that had been in operation since the early nineteenth 
century. In the next three chapters, an attempt will be 
made to identify the key influences that operated upon 
the management and determined the techniques that they 
used to expedite business. An attempt will be made to 
ascertain how far such strategies were consciously 
orchestrated and how far they were innate, either 
because of the nature of the firm or the nature of the 
families who were involved. In order to achieve this, 
an examination will be made of the type of work that 
was carried out by the management and an attempt will 
be made to reconstruct the management hierarchy, 
demonstrating the relationship between members of the 
families and paid managers. This will be organised so 
that in this chapter, a general survey of the work of 
the Board of Directors who came from the three families 
will be studied; in chapter IV, an attempt will be made 
to analyse some of the motivations that underlay this 
conduct, whilst simultaneously expanding upon the 
provisions that were made by the company for the 
workforce; in chapter V, the nature of the work of the 
employed management, will be examined and some 
conclusions based on the material of these three
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chapters will be drawn.
It was determined at a Board meeting on April 
29th, 1898, that in order to become a member of the 
Board of Directors, a holding of one hundred shares was 
required. This meeting also established the principle 
of membership of the Board by members of the three 
families: "while it is expedient that each of the three 
families who comprises the present shareholders should 
be represented, we wish to emphasise the fact that mere 
parentage conveys no right nor claim for election." (1) 
At the time of the flotation in 1889, 6,175 shares were 
held by the twelve members of the Buxton family, 3,650 
by the eleven members of the Hanbury family and 2,325 
by the six members of the Pryor family. This meant that 
the Buxtons owned 50.8 per cent of the company, the 
Hanburys owned 30 per cent and the Pryors 19 per cent. 
It was anticipated that the number of shareholders with 
more than one hundred shares would increase as deaths 
among the original group of twenty-nine led to their 
shares being bequeathed to more than one of their 
descendants, thus providing a permanent pool of talent 
to be tapped for the benefit of the brewery.
There appears to have been a widespread 
enthusiasm for involvement in the brewery among the 
families; two examples may serve to illustrate this 
point. Firstly, Noel Buxton writing to Edwy (E.N. 
Buxton) in an undated letter, probably stemming from 
the early 1930s, commented: "by the way, you asked me
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the other day what m y  boys were going to do. I should 
very much like to see one of them in the brewery if he 
proved to have a useful business capacity." (2) 
Secondly, in a letter from A.V. Pryor, who had married 
the Countess of Wilton late in life, and had no 
children of his own, to the Board of Directors: " I
wish to put on record that I am hoping that my nephew, 
John Pryor, age fourteen, will be allowed to become a 
candidate for a directorship in Truman, Hanbury, Buxton 
and Company when the proper time comes." (3) According 
to John Pryor himself some thirty years later, this was 
not what he had wanted: "My elder brother died...and I
was informed that I must give up all idea of the Army 
as I was designated for the Brewery." (4)
Such commitment to involvement arose from a 
complex variety of factors that ranged from 
self-interest, ensuring the continued profitability and 
advancement of the company, through to a feeling that 
familial continuity created moral obligations on the 
part of the owners to their workforce. This latter 
point is well illustrated in a further undated letter 
from Noel Buxton to Edwy: "On moral grounds...we could 
as a private affair do as we thought right by the men 
and in other ways and I think there is a strong 
argument in our case, arising from the Buxton tradition 
in particular. It is a remarkable piece of history, 
begun by the Slave Liberator - of business combined 
with public work * and now represented in the fifth
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generation by yourself.... With production dwindled and 
yet unemployment trebled, the profit-making motive is 
not proving very adequate. But that is largely because 
capital in the ordinary form is irresponsible and 
non-moral. Trumans represents a form of capital that is 
too uncommon," (5) This apparently private letter 
suggests that there existed a real sense of the duty of 
employers on the part of Noel Buxton, a sense that 
sprang from religious conviction, according to his 
biographer: "there was a remoteness between the
employers and the workers which Buxton felt was 
inconsistent with the Christian outlook and laboured to 
bridge." (6)
Mere enthusiasm however, was never sufficient to 
guarantee a successful candidacy for Board membership. 
Ability was always a prerequisite; this point was 
clearly demonstrated in the letter already cited in the 
preceding paragraph: "When you speak of the advantage
of keeping each family in a degree of balance, I would 
quantify that by the even greater importance of your 
other point - that selection for fitness should be 
stringent." (7) It was however possible to become a 
Director with no real experience of the work of the 
brewery, as for example, Christine Hanbury did on the 
death of her husband in 1923. This though, may have had 
more to do with the increasing number of women being 
employed at the brewery from the 1920s, which may have 
engendered a feeling that there ought to be a female
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Director who would closely associate herself with their 
welfare. As Mrs. Martindale, a Senior Lady Inspector of 
Factories had indicated as early as 1911: "At times,
when I am inspecting a factory, I find myself wishing 
that the employer's wife would also inspect it, as 
benefits for women workers would, I am sure, be the 
result of her visit.... More and more I am persuaded of 
the value of a woman's insight in the arranging for the 
welfare of workers." (8)
Christine Hanbury's case may well therefore have 
been an exception to the principle of 'selection for 
fitness' on the basis of her sex. It was much more 
typical in the inter-war period for the young men who 
were entering the brewery to serve a period of 
employment in some section of the industry in order to 
demonstrate their merit before being allowed to join 
the Board of Directors. J.C.M. Hanbury, for example, 
joined the company in 1931, being employed at the 
Burton brewery, but did not join the Board until 1933. 
M.A. Pryor worked for three years at the Ipswich 
Malting Company before joining the Burton brewery for a 
year and finally gaining his place on the Board in 
1934. Membership of the Board thus implied at least 
some practical knowledge of some aspects of the working 
of the brewery. It also involved a commitment in terms 
of time; Thomas Powell Buxton wrote to his mother from 
his accomodation over the brewery in 1808: "I was up 
this morning at four and do not expect to finish my
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day's work before twelve tonight." (9) It may be that 
his successors did not exercise quite this degree of 
diligence, but many Buxtons and some Hanburys were to 
follow his example of resigning from their 
responsibilities at the brewery on election to 
political office, recognising that it was impossible to 
fulfill both commitments adequately at the same time.
The rules for Board membership established in 
1898 had laid down that the maximum number of Directors 
was to be ten, but in reality this maximum was only 
rarely reached. Specific Directors would be assigned to 
specific functions, although in practice there would be 
a great deal of overlap of duties. This is indicated by 
the delineation of duties of the junior Directors that 
was drawn up in 1920. H.F. Buxton was to superintend 
any matters connected with the Bottling Stores, Works 
Department and the Cooperage. He was also to help J.H. 
Buxton in the management of the Country Trade. J.A. 
Pryor was the Burton Director, but was additionally to 
assist in the purchasing of materials for both Burton 
and London, attend to brewing matters and to the 
running of the Stables and to assist in the 
superintendence of the Bottling Stores and the Works 
Department. Geoffrey Dent, a Buxton through his mother, 
was to assist both H.F. Buxton and J.A. Pryor in the 
Works Department. He was also involved in checking the 
accounts. E.N. Buxton Junior was to assist both 6. 
Buxton in the Clock Room, where much of the general
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administrative work was conducted, and Geoffrey Dent in 
the checking of accounts. (10) In this way, all the 
Directors became expert in certain areas, but in the 
event of the absence or retirement of specific 
Directors, there would always be continuity of 
experience.
The decisions that the Board of Directors were 
involved in making were wide-ranging in their subject 
matter, encompassing every aspect of brewery life and 
welfare, ranging from the most essential to the most 
mundane. This was not an unusual phenomenon in British 
industry. Chandler has pointed out that in many of the 
family-controlled enterprises in the top two hundred 
company list, the owners were often absorbed in the 
daily operational activities that one would expect of 
middle management. (11) It is to a consideration of 
some of these diverse activities that attention will 
now be directed.
At Rest each year, when the year's accounts would 
be audited, there would be a series of meetings
attended by all of the Directors in which the financial
commitments faced by the brewery would be examined.
This would include publican's rents and the cost of 
leases and loans to be made to properties owned by the 
brewery throughout the country. Such decisions were 
made on the basis of personal knowledge of the 
prevailing situation. Members of the Board would
frequently travel to out of London sites to see what
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was going on. One such trip was undertaken by J.A. 
Pryor in 1922 to Swansea, where rebuilding work had 
begun on the depot. In the course of his day trip he 
managed to visit the new store and ten public houses, 
and to gather a general picture of the economic state 
of the area as it was likely to impinge on the licensed 
trade. Within a fortnight of his return a memorandum 
outlining his conclusions was circulating amongst other 
Board members. (12) In the early 1920s the meetings at 
which such financial decisions would be taken could be 
fitted into the course of a single week, but by the 
early 1930s, the number of meetings had increased, and 
they took place over a period that could range from two 
weeks to two months. Part of the reason for this 
increase was the growing number of breweries and tied 
properties that the company was acquiring. This too, 
was the consequence of decisions reached at Board 
level. Thus, the last quarter of 1930 saw a flurry of 
activity by Board members. In a letter to Edward 
Buxton, John Buxton noted that: "I have been round the
Writtle and Gravesend houses (the Gravesend with my 
father) and we both like the proposals and feel the 
properties would not need great expense in upkeep. We 
are now going into the costs of delivery direct from 
Brick Lane." (13) A week later, H.F. Buxton (John's 
father) was to write: "Geof (Dent) and I are seeing
some of the Maldon properties tomorrow," (14) and on 
the same day the two of them had been to see Leslie
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Tritton who was the company's Bank Manager, presumably 
to arrange the forthcoming debenture issuethat would be 
used at least in part to finance the purchase of all 
three of these provincial breweries which would take 
place over the following twelve months. A further 
related function of the Board was to sanction the 
purchase of a wide range of materials and equipment. It 
is clear that the Burton Director would generally be 
involved directly in the choice and cost of materials/ 
calling upon the advice and expertise of the Head 
Brewer to guide him. In terms of the purchase of 
equipment, the extent of the involvement by individual 
Directors is less clear. It seems more likely that in 
this instance much was left to the discretion of the 
General Manager.
The Board did however, concern itself very 
closely with the workings of the labour force. It was 
the Board that determined when it was appropriate to 
employ additional workers. Such an expansion was 
particularly marked in the early years of the century 
when the growth of the bottled beer trade required the 
employment of extra workers on the bottling machinery 
and as specialist brewers and .sales staff. Similarly, 
in slack times it was the Board that took the decision 
whether to lay off workers. It was the Board too which 
determined the levels of wages to be paid. They were 
influenced in their decisions pertaining to wages by 
three factors. Firstly, the state of the trade: wages
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had a tendency to fluctuate in response to this. 
Secondly, the levels of wages being paid by other
breweries: thus in 1918, the company fixed its minimum 
wage at 43 shillings, in line with Whitbreads. (15) 
Thirdly, pressure from the workers and their
representatives: thus in 1919, Gerald Buxton met the 
draymen and the women employed in the Bottling Store, 
when both of these groups felt they had a legitimate 
grievance against the company. The upshot of this
meeting was that the Board "decided to grant an 
interview to the union officials with a view to mutual
explanations and in the hope of satifactory 
arrangements." (16) Within a week, a meeting with the 
Brewers' Workers Union had led to a satisfactory 
resolution of the grievances. Yet these three 
influences were not immutable factors in determining 
the conduct of the Board. They would try to stave off 
wage reductions for as long as possible; when Bass in 
Burton asked for unilateral action in the reduction of 
Maltsters' wages, they refused to discuss it as an
isolated issue, preferring to defer the question for a 
four month period, (17) and when the Brewers' Workers 
Union had suggested an overtime rate of Is 3d to 
resolve the draymen's dispute in 1919, the Board had 
responded with an offer of Is 6d. (18) It is of course 
possible that their motive for this action was to 
undercut support for the union. Although such a motive 
is not explicitly stated, it is true that Trumans do
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not in general appear to have been one of the better 
paying breweries to work for in the inter-war period. 
Evidence for this can be constructed from comparisons 
between the wage books of the brewery and information 
provided in the New Survev of London Life and Labour. 
Tor instance, the average wage rate indicated by the 
Ministry of Labour for a mechanical driver was
seventy-four shillings per week, (19) whereas at 
Trumans it was seventy-three shillings. Even more 
usefully, the average rates of a London brewery in 1930 
were provided. Employing forty-one coopers, the 
anonymous brewery's average rate in that department was 
83s 9d. (20) By comparison, the thirty-one coopers at
Trumans earned an average rate of seventy-five 
shillings.
It is true that such comparisons are fraught with 
problems; the exact nature of the workers used to 
arrive at the anonymous brewery's average rate is not 
stated. Nonetheless such statistical evidence does at 
least provide some support for the general perception 
that existed among some brewery workers who were 
engaged in conversation during this research that their 
wages were marginally lower thajn they could have earned 
elsewhere. Yet in spite of these relatively lower 
wages, whether they be real or imagined, there was 
generally a low rate of turnover in the workforce, with 
many men serving long periods of employment with the 
company. Part of the explanation for this phenomenon
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may lie in the non-monetary renumeration which was 
offered to the workforce, which contributed to a sense 
of company loyalty. It is to a survey of the key 
elements of this and to an attempt to identify the 
management's motivations in engaging in such practices 
that the next chapter will be addressed.
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CHAPTER IV - PATERNALISM, MANAGEMENT AND 
THE WORKFORCE
Melling (1) has argued that there are three 
distinct ways of approaching any study of welfare 
provision: an empirical approach would define welfare 
in terms of the range and content of the amenities 
provided; a purportive approach would examine the 
motives for the provision of the amenities and a 
functional . approach would examine the objective 
functions that welfare fulfilled, irrespective of the 
motives that underlay its provisions. This enquiry 
proposes to take aspects of each of these approaches in 
order to reach conclusions about the nature of the 
welfare provision that was in operation at Trumans 
brewery in the inter-war years. In this chapter, a 
survey will be made of the key components of the 
welfare (ie non-monetary) provision that was on offer 
to the workforce. An attempt will be made to identify 
the motives of the management in creating or continuing 
these policies, although it is not always possible to 
achieve this, either because it was done without 
conscious intent or because that conscious intent was 
not explicitly articulated in the sources. However, as 
Melling points out, whatever the motives of the 
employers, whether they be conscious or not, welfare 
provision did fulfill certain objective functions. 
Therefore, an inherent part of this chapter will be to 
attempt to identify this functional impact.
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Paternalism had characterised the conduct of the 
brewery's management from a very early point in its 
history; Thomas Powell Buxton believed in "education as 
an indispensable means to freedom," (2) and so shortly 
after he had come to the brewery he hired a school 
master and told the brewery workforce that "this day 
six weeks I shall discharge every man who cannot read 
and write." (3) Legend has it that not a single man was 
sacked. Other aspects of paternalistic provision
included an annual present since at least 1819, the 
establishment of a reading room and library, 
discretionary pensions and gratuities and the provision 
of some recreational facilities, amongst other things. 
As has already been indicated, the motives that 
underlay such practices were complex, encompassing a
general desire to help others whilst simultaneously
furthering the direct interests of the company. Thus,
the provision of schools for the sons of workmen was 
philanthropic, but the fact that "the mental training 
is made subsidiary to the interests of the firm...and 
the lads who show the most talent and industry have the 
first offer of employment in the brewery" (4) served 
the economic interests of the firm. At all times, the 
care of the employee was tempered with reason; so that 
in 1825, one of the partners was led to comment: "Take 
especial care not to pension those men who have not 
been good men as it has a bad effect." (5)
It is clear that members of the Board were
61
conscious of this tradition of paternalism and commited 
to its maintenance. The undated letter from Noel Buxton 
to E.N. Buxton quoted in chapter III shows this, as 
does E.N. Buxton's own speech on Gerald Buxton's 
illness which had kept him away from the annual trip to 
Brighton in 1927: "The traditions he had tried to live 
up to, as he would admit were not his own inventions 
for he had received them from his father." (6) In view 
of their conscious emulation of the past, it seems 
likely that members of the families would have been 
aware of the benefits that could have been derived from 
the pursuit of such policies.
In any event, such practices were not unique to 
Trumans. Fitzgerald has shown that across the brewing 
trade, extensive use had been made of paternalistic 
devices throughout the nineteenth century as a 
mechanism for managing the labour force. In relatively 
small units of production personal links between the 
employer and the labour force were possible and these 
links could be reinforced by the effective use of 
gratuities made on an ex gratia basis. In other 
industries, as the scale of production increased during 
the course of the nineteenth century, such practices 
might be modified or cease altogether. In brewing, by 
comparison, the scale of production tended to increase 
merely as a function of amalgamation, rather than as a 
consequence of fundamental changes in the processes. 
Those who had dominated the industry in the nineteenth
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century tended to continue to dominate it in the 
twentieth century too. Thus in many breweries, 
nineteenth century paternalistic practices persisted 
and even expanded in the early twentieth century. 
(7)
It seems probable that to the well-established 
paternalistic tradition that existed within Trumans was 
brought an awareness of the wide-ranging contemporary 
debate about methods of effective management. This 
debate had its origins in the early years of the 
century, with one of the leading group of participants 
being the Rowntrees. A similarity of outlook was shared 
by this family. with their "Quaker conception of 
business as a trust" (8) and the Hanburys and Buxtons, 
as were social links. Briggs, for example, refers to a 
breakfast in 1912 shared by B.S. Rowntree and Charles 
Buxton. (9) Discussion of common points of interest 
arising from business would seem to have been highly 
likely. Indeed, interest in some of these issues seems 
to have reached Board level. On several occasions, 
references are made that suggest new ideas were being 
considered by the Board. In 1930, for example, 
Christine Hanbury went to New York to visit a number of 
American factories, and in the account of her visit 
that was published in the 'Black Eagle,' she makes it 
clear that she disapproves of the American approach to 
welfare work. She believed that this tended to treat 
each worker "as a bit of machinery - to be kept in good
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repair because it pays, then scrapped." (10) Her views 
raise several important issues. Firstly, she was 
clearly aware of the implications of the American 
system, which implies some familiarity with the welfare 
work debate. Secondly, she implies that her view of the 
necessity for a system that maintains the physical 
efficiency of the workforce was derived from a more 
altruistic perspective than that of mere profitability. 
As this statement was made in the company magazine, it 
seems likely that this view was shared by other members 
of the Board. F.H. Jeacock, the Staff Manager, in 
addressing the London section of the Institute of 
Brewers in 1932 also showed himself conversant with 
current developments when he suggested that "it is 
being recognised that due consideration of, and for the 
worker is a sound business policy and not a mere 
economic fad.... It is a policy which gives a 
commercial return and is to the mutual advantage of. 
employer and employee." (11) It seem unlikely that such 
a statement would have been made in such a public arena 
without at least the tacit support of the Board. This 
thus reinforces the view that some sort of debate about 
contemporary issues was going on at Board level.
What clearly needs to be analysed is firstly, the 
motives of management, which is clearly a difficult 
task both because of the complexity of those motives 
and the paucity of explicit written evidence relating 
to them. Further, such evidence as is available may
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merely be a legitimation of other submerged motives and 
great caution needs to be exercised in its use. 
Secondly, an examination needs to be made of the extent 
to which non-monetary renumeration was a continuation 
of existing practice and the extent to which it marked 
a fundamental departure from traditional paternalistic 
practices. In order to achieve these two objectives, a 
brief survey of the main forms of the non-monetary 
rewards available to the workforce will be made.
The sports and social provision provided by the 
company expanded rapidly during the inter-war period. 
There had been some ad hoc provision for many years: 
the cricket team can be traced back to at least 1884, 
when annual matches against Whitbreads began; in 1909, 
part of the motor shed was partitioned off to provide a 
rifle range for the Rifle Club; in 1912, £5 was given
by the Board to a group of men who were trying to form 
a football team; in 1916, a tennis court was built on 
the roof of Number 18, above the cellars. Increasingly 
systematic provision was made after the war with the 
advent of annual sports days from 1919, to which both 
the workforce and their families were invited. These 
events were held initially at the homes of members of 
the Board of Directors - in 1919 at Great West Hatch 
(J.M, Hanbury), in 1920 at Easneye (J.H. Buxton), and 
in 1921 at Birch Hall (Gerald Buxton). After this date 
the sports ground at Highams Park ahd been purchased 
and was used. The Directors acted as judges and
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stewards and presented the prizes, but they did not 
participate in the races. Nonetheless, these occasions 
served to reinforce an image which had been
successfully developed in the course of the nineteenth 
century of the company as a family with common
interests and concerns shared by employers and 
employees alike. This perception is made explicit on a 
number of occasions, such as the report on a Sports 
Club dinner attended by both Directors and workers: 
"The atmosphere of a happy family prevailed throughout 
the evening." (12) This view of the company was not 
confined to in-house publications, but was also being 
presented in the local press. In a flattering report on 
the annual trip in 1927, reference was made to "this 
family concern - family in principles and family in 
employees." (13) The development of the image of the 
family was an inherent part of the process by which 
worker loyalty could be maintained for it promoted a 
sense of co-operation, of "duty, service and effort in 
a common cause." (14)
Such a creation of a family mythology appears to 
have been widespread among those who were engaged in 
paternalistic practices. As Waller points out in the
Dukeries, the "domestic landmarks of the employers'
families did not go unnoticed. Births and marriages 
were feted, the coming of age of sons was celebrated, 
the dynasty was rejuvenated and renewed." (15) In the 
pages of the 'Black Eagle', such celebration of key
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events in the lives of the workforce might also be 
found, a further reinforcemnt of the notion that all 
who worked at the brewery were part of the same 
community. The extent to which this sense of the 
"family" was consciously exploited is impossible to 
judge. What is clear though is that it gave the company 
the opportunity to emphasise very clearly the common 
interests of all who were connected with it.
Although the provision of sports and social 
facilities was being actively promoted, initially the 
workforce's attitude to it was rather apathetic, 
perhaps because they were pursuing their leisure 
activities elsewhere. In 1923, only about one hundred 
employees belonged to the Sports Club. This figure had 
however risen to 567 by 1929, thereby comprising 95 per 
cent of the workforce. The most likely explanation for 
this expansion of interest was the opening of a 
licensed club room over the canteen at Brick Lane. This 
contained snooker, billiards, bagatelle, table-tennis, 
darts, dominoes and card games. It may well have been 
further reinforced by the purchase of a sports ground 
on which considerable amounts of money were spent for 
improvements: £1,000 for sundries in 1924, £2,500 for a 
sports pavilion in 1929 and the purchase of a charabanc 
for excursions in 1934. Inter and intra brewery 
competitions were organised at the sports ground, being 
made even more convivial by the provision of free 
drinks and sandwiches. Thus, the Sports Club expanded
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for the perfectly sound reason that the employees 
derived a considerable amount of subsidised enjoyment 
from it. It activities were further highlighted by the 
reporting of them in the pages of 'Black Eagle', which
rose from a coverage of six pages in the first edition
of 1929 to twenty-six pages by 1938.
That the Directors had motives other than the 
mere amusement of the labour force was implied in a 
number of ways. For example, in 1925, they instituted 
the Directors' Cup, a trophy for the department winning 
the highest number of points in various indoor and 
outdoor sports, with the avowed aim of encouraging a 
team spirit of co-operation, which they no doubt 
aspired to see carried over into the workplace. In the 
pages of 'Black Eagle' are to be found a variety of
remarks which clearly reflect the best hopes of the
Directors. These include; "a man who works hard and 
plays hard is usually a type to encourage," (16) or "a 
good sports club...is the best means...for fitting us 
to do our job in life with greater efficiency." (17) 
What seems clear is that there was a convergence of 
interests that proved to be of benefit to both sides to 
pursue insofar as both appeared' to successfully achieve 
separate objectives. For the employers, it increased 
worker loyalty and efficiency because it encouraged 
co-operation. At the same time, it contributed to the 
fulfillment of their perception 'of the duties of 
management vis-a-vis their workforce. For the workers,
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it provided opportunities for organised leisure 
pursuits.
As has already been indicated, further 
opportunities both for recreation and the promotion of 
the family image were provided by the annual excursion. 
This had begun as far back as 1851, possibly with a 
trip to the Great Exhibition in that year. Such "bean 
feasts" had continued uninterrupted through to 1914, 
and had been a typical element in the armoury of many 
paternalistic employers offering as they did both a 
clear demonstration of their concern for the enjoyment 
of the workforce and an opportunity to reinforce the 
image of the company as a family as employers and 
employees sat down to eat their tea together. Joyce has 
demonstrated the use of such strategies by the cotton 
manufacturers of the nineteenth century. By 
implementing devices such as these they were able to 
emphasise the degree of "co-operation and the 
recognition of mutual interests" (18) that they wished 
to suggest pertained in the workplace. This led to the 
workforce identifying their employers' actions as being 
determined by the interests of all those that were 
involved in the company.
Paternalistic strategies in the cotton industry 
declined from the 1890s, but they continued in the 
brewing industry unabated. Indeed, where many firms did 
not revive the tradition of the "bean feast" after the 
war, having begun with a trip to Southend in 1919 just
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for the men, Trumans made it a more-or-less annual 
event, and extended it to the women and families. The 
only exceptions were the years when trade was 
particularly bad at the start of the 1930s. The precise 
motives of the management in resurrecting this 
tradition are not clear; it is true that it could 
certainly continue to fulfill its pre-war functions, 
and every opportunity was taken at these events to 
extol the virtues of the employers and the company, 
which it may have been felt were likely to increase the 
sense of loyalty that bound the workforce to the 
company, but nowhere are such attitudes explicitly 
expressed. A further motive may have been related to 
free advertising as each year's excursion was reported 
in a full page article in the Citv and East London 
Observer. What is clear, is that the majority of 
employees took advantage of the excursion, although it 
is impossible to draw any conclusions about their views 
on the speeches which addressed the issues of loyalty 
and co-operation.
Company pensions and gratuities had been granted 
since the early nineteenth century, but had never been 
given as of right, merely at the discretion of the 
Board. In general, the granting of a pension was 
related to three criteria: the age of the applicant,
the length of service (if this was deemed to be 
insufficient, a gift rather than a pension was likely 
to be conferred) and personal circumstances - a worker
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in receipt of state old age pension or a trade 
superannuation, for example, would receive a reduced 
company pension. It was common practice among brewery 
companies to use their pension schemes to restrict 
organisation amongst their labour force; Watneys, for 
example, by granting pensions only to those with 
continuous service could deny them to any worker who at 
any point in his service had been on strike, whilst 
Friary, Holroyd and Healey's granted them only to 
non-union members. (19) Such a system, where "the 
provision assumes the form of a bounty bestowed upon a 
deserving worker by a considerate superior" (20) had 
come under attack and some commentators were arguing 
for a situation where the worker knew with certainty 
and in advance that his old age would be provided for.
Trumans do not appear to have employed their 
system of pensions for such overt methods of labour 
control as these other breweries, but it is apparent 
that they did wish to retain the more traditional, and 
indeed, the more deferential approach to the granting 
of pensions. As H.F. Buxton informed the workforce at 
the annual outing in 1927, £60,000 had been put away
over the previous three years in order to secure 
pensions, both past and future, but "this does not 
alter our system of pensions in any way, it is still 
entirely at the discretion of the Directors when and 
how much any one shall receive." (21) Whilst such a 
strategy could have increased worker resentments, its
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apparent results seem to have been to have contributed 
to an increased worker loyalty. The likely reason for 
this was, as Hannah has suggested, that "where the 
tradition (of granting discretionary pensions) was 
particularly well developed, the employer, though he 
had discretion in individual cases, could no more have 
generally and unilaterally stopped such pensions than 
he could have ceased contributing to the local church 
and reading room." (22) He argues that such pensions 
were part of a system of reciprocal relations and were 
recognised on all sides as such. Such an understanding 
on the part of the workforce goes some way to explain 
why the son of Rayner Wesley was able to write on his 
father's death that "We do not forget but that his 
years were lengthened by the fact that through the 
kindness and generous help of the Brewery, he was 
spared from any sort of financial worry." (23) Through 
such a promotion of worker loyalty, turnover would be 
minimised, ensuring a continuity of experienced 
workers.
Thus, the policy itself had beneficial results, 
but the fact that it was implemented in this particular 
way gives rise to a range of interpretations about the 
management. It could be taken to suggest that although 
members of the Board were cognisant of the current 
debate on welfare work, they had not assimilated all 
its implications. It could be argued that their 
approach to this issue was rooted in nineteenth century
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have an appeal to any management that was concerned 
with the efficiency of its workforce. Despite this, 
when in 1900 Gerald Buxton made the suggestion that 
some aid should be given to support the Association's 
work, the idea was initially rejected because of the 
fact that it was actuarially unsound. It was not until 
1906 that help was given, contingent on a "reduction of 
the sick pay and an alteration of one or two of the 
rules affecting payment at death of members and their 
wives." (25) The draymen were not part of the Black 
Eagle Mutual Association for they had their own 
organisation, the Draymen's Mutual Association, 
membership of which was compulsory. They also had their 
own pension scheme and accident fund. This was the 
consequence of the nature of the work they were engaged 
in, which made it likely that they would not be able 
to continue working for what was considered as che 
normal time span for work. In order both to ensure 
their loyalty in their limited working life and to 
limit cost of pensions and gratuities to this group, 
arrangements such as this were necessary. All these 
separate provisions disappeared in the aftermath of the 
war, presumably both because of the changing nature of 
their work, with the growing importance of mechanised 
transport, and because of changes in the government's 
national insurance schemes. The third area of self-help 
that existed was the Savings Bank, in which any member 
of the company, past or present could deposit money at
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a return of three per cent. It was underwritten by the 
company to ensure its continuing operation. By 1927,
I
deposits with it amounted to £27,000 with its customers 
including ninety-one workmen, forty-three members of 
staff, twenty Directors and their families and a wide 
variety of company-linked organisations, such as the 
Sports Club, the Library Association and the Black 
eagle Mutual Association.
The provision of such self-help facilities 
obviously harked back to the nineteenth century liberal 
ideology which the families had supported. Their 
continued existence cost the company very little in 
terms of money, but would have fulfilled obligations of 
duty, whilst having the potential to act favourably 
upon efficiency and upon the sense of a family in which 
all members were concerned about other members. Such a 
sense was not confined to Trumans. It is also evident 
in the writings of Cadbury. "It has been thought 
advisable to encourage saving among the workers, 
notwithstanding the fact that there are ample 
provisions publicly made to promote thrift." (26)
In terms of health provision, particularly in 
view of the prevailing debate .about the efficiency of 
the workforce and the involvement of both Buxtons and 
Hanburys as governors of the London Hospital, 
remarkably little was done. Periodically, the Board of 
Directors would ask the public vaccinator to attend the 
brewery and would arrange for a nurse from the London
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Hospital to be there afterwards to dress arms and give 
advice, and should anyone have to take time off as a
I
consequence of their vaccination they were entitled to 
full pay. Until 1928, Gerald Buxton had personally met 
the costs of the convalescence of any company employee 
whom the Company Doctor had indicated required this 
facility; in that year, the company took over the 
responsibility for meeting this payment. Until 1935, 
when an Ambulance Room was provided, the only other 
medical facility offered to the employees was an 
examination by the Company Doctor after they had been 
employed for six months in order to check up on their 
physical fitness for the work they were engaged upon. 
If there were any doubts, they were unlikely to be 
sacked on the spot, but would be required to have a 
further examination six months later. Despite the lack 
of medical provision made directly by the company, they 
did not object to the workforce organising their own 
care. This reinforces earlier remarks about self-help. 
In 1923, branch E6 of the Hospital Savings Association 
came into existence at Brick Lane. In return for a 
weekly subscription of threepence the member or any 
member of his immediate family would receive a voucher 
which would enable them to obtain hospital, dental, 
optical or convalescent treatment. At the outset of the 
scheme, 486 employees joined, comprising the vast 
majority of the workforce. From this point, it becomes 
hard to keep track of the membership as people leaving
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the brewery, either through retirement or to work 
elsewhere, would keep on their membership of this 
branch. The Directors paid the contributions of all 
pensioners, which was not as altruistic as it might 
appear to be at first glance. In the event of a 
pensioner falling ill, he would generally apply to the 
Board for a gratuity, and he would also generally 
receive it. Thus, in much the same way as the workforce 
used the scheme as a system of insurance against 
sickness, so too did the Directors.
Annual presents had been granted at Rest since at 
least 1819, being determined on the basis of length of 
service, record of attendance over the preceding year 
and general attitude to work in the previous twelve 
months. In 1925, a more systematic method of payment 
known as the Shareholders' bonus was introduced. It was 
more systematic in the sense that a given scale of 
rates was set down; in the first five years of its 
operation, for example, it comprised of an additional 
week's salary. It therefore compares favourably with 
the pensions and gratuities in that it was clearly 
defined, although all or part of it could be witheld 
from persistent latecomers. Nonetheless, its existence 
does suggest that in some areas the management was 
moving forward in the practices that it engaged in, 
although it served clear functions for them. Firstly, 
because all or part of it could be denied, it served as 
a disincentive to idleness. Secondly, it could act in a
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less clearly measurable way as an incentive to harder 
work, for the amount of the bonus could be varied from
I
year to year according to the profits that were made. 
When announcing the 1935 bonus, which was lower than it 
had been in previous years, the Chairman remarked that 
"I am hoping that the ensuing year with your loyal 
support - I will repeat that - with your loyal support, 
we shall be able to increase it." (27) In this way the 
bonus tended to reinforce the feeling that employer and 
employee had a common interest which would best be 
served through co-operation rather than through 
conflict. Yet to suggest exclusively profit-related 
motives would not be to tell the whole story. In 1929, 
for instance, which was a particularly bad year for the 
brewing industry, one shareholder telegraphed the 
Chairman: " Damn the dividend and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. Employees and staff must come first!", (28) 
insisting that the bonus should be paid out, as indeed 
it was, and at the previous year's level. Such an 
attitude typified much of what went on in the company; 
there were often sound business reasons for a given 
course of action, but there was also an underlying 
concern about the condition of the workforce inherited 
from the traditions of the nineteenth century. As Emden 
has suggested "they (Quaker employers) never lost sight 
of the human factor...and that success is not 
necessarily achieved , at the expense of others." (29) 
That is not to suggest that only Quaker employers were
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introducing profit-sharing schemes, for they were part 
of the armoury of the welfare work movement. What is 
clear though, is that for companies like Trumans, there 
were many forces that were operating upon management 
leading them to employ the strategies that they did.
The only entirely new innovation that was made by 
the management in the inter-war years was the 
establishment of a Works Committee along the lines of 
many others that were being introduced in this period. 
The idea seems to have been floated initially as a 
consequence of discussions that were taking place among 
the London brewers in 1920, but nothing very tangible 
arose directly from this. According to the Directors' 
minutes, the real impetus came from a group of workers 
"who were wishful to appoint a representative committee 
to confer with the Directors from time to time on 
matters affecting their mutual interest." (30) There 
was no suggestion by the Directors that this group 
represented any organised trade union. After this 
representation, the Board considered the request and 
decided to establish a Works Committee on lines laid 
down by them. Each department would have two 
representatives on the Committee, whose main areas of 
responsibilities were to include the organisation of 
collections for men who had been away sick for more 
than three months through sickness or accident, the 
direction of canteen facilities and the organisation of 
trips to other factories. It might, by arrangement, or
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at the request of the Board of Directors, discuss other 
matters, such as holidays, insurance schemes and short 
time working. It was expressly forbidden any
discussion of wages or of the management of the 
company.
The fact that the Works Committee therefore had 
no real power to discuss things that might have been of 
direct concern to the workforce seems to have been 
tacitly recognised on all sides. In April, 1924, there 
was only one nomination for a vacancy on the Committee, 
and this general lack of interest was further 
emphasised in May 1927 when the Secretary of the 
Committee sent a letter to the Board of Directors 
complaining of the irregular attendance by some 
members. It therefore seems unlikely that the Works 
Committee was achieving what the original group of 
workers had hoped and expected of it in terms of acting 
as an intermediary between the employers and the 
workforce. Various problems apparently persisted, as in 
March 1928, the Directors reconstituted the 
organisation of the Committee. It now comprised of one 
representative from each department, together with the 
addition of one foreman and one head of department. It 
seems likely that these latter two were included in 
order to ensure attendance. The decision by the Board 
to attempt to reform the Committee rather than to 
abandon it seems to suggest that they had hijacked the 
idea for their own purposes. Indeed, the reports of its
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meetings that were carried in the in-house magazine 
that was first produced at the behest of the Works 
Committee in 1929 suggest that it had merely become the 
mouthpiece of the management. Thus, a fairly typical
response to the Directors' proposal to increase
insurance in 1930 was that "whatever the decision of
the Directors is, it will be such as to leave us no
cause for complaint." (31)
In the United States of America during the 1920s, 
the evidence suggestes that strategies such as 
profit-sharing and the establishment of Works 
Committees were being explicitly used by employers as a 
means of holding down wage rises whilst simultaneously 
increasing productivity and as a way of resisting trade 
union pressures for changes. (32) There is no direct 
evidence that Trumans utilised such strategies for 
these purposes. It is however clear that the management 
of the brewery saw the continuation of a wide variety 
of existing paternalistic practices to be in their best 
interests as employers. By suggesting the community of 
interest that existed, they could create a sense of 
co-operation rather than of conflict between employer 
and employed, and show the workforce that by their 
involvement in this system they too would share in the 
benefits: "Mr. H.F. Buxton...was sure that nobody would 
drink to the health of the firm without enthusiasm for 
they were all bound up in it. Its prosperity was 
dependent on what the Directors were able to do for the
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men and what the employees were able to give in 
return." (33) By thus promoting à sense of loyalty 
among their workers, the management was contributing to 
the creation of a strong internal labour market that 
was likely to help it to enhance its profitability.
Although the management did not explicitly make 
any reference to the role of trade unionism in the 
brewery, many of its strategies could be interpreted as 
mechanisms for undermining any potential support for 
organised labour. In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, trade unionism in the brewing 
industry was weak. Labour problems were resolved within 
the firm and would not be discussed by the brewers' 
associations. Thus, as Fitzgerald has pointed out: "the 
influence of employers and their discretionary benefits 
over the attitudes and actions of their workers" was 
increased. (34) It has been indicated that for some 
brewers, pension schemes could be used as a method of 
preventing union membership. The same could be said for 
profit-sharing schemes. Bowie wrote in 1922, for 
example, that "the bitterest present day antagonism is 
between worker and employer...profit-sharing schemes 
arise in proportion to the acuteness of the question." 
(35) It is certainly the case that Russell and Wrangham 
introduced profit-sharing in 1911 in response to a 
threat of a strike. (36) Works Committees could be seen 
as a further means of undermining the role of trade 
unions and collective bargaining. In a broad sense,
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there is no apparent difference between the practices 
that; prevailed at Trumans and those in existence at 
other breweries. An extensive study of the Directors' 
minutes does not reveal their motives or their views on 
the issue of trade unionism, presumably because these 
were so well understood by all those present. 
Rubinstein suggests that "rich liberal brewers were 
virtually unheard of after 1886," (37) yet not only did 
Hanburys and Buxtons remain liberal, but some made the 
move to the Labour Party, so no easy conclusions are 
possible.
Moreover, the analysis to this point has ignored 
the potential existence of a more altruistic dimension. 
The inter-war period saw an attempt by Quaker employers 
to rationalise the fundamental conflict that arose for 
them by participating in industry. At the 1918 
Conference of Quaker Employers, it was argued that "our 
true status and function in society is the true spirit 
which regards industry as a national service to be 
carried on for the benefit of the community," (38) an 
idea which was echoed in 1937 by B.S. Rowntree: 
"whatever may be the motive which induces us to engage 
in industry, the real purpose of industry is communal 
service." (39) Such a striving to reconcile industry 
and religion was also apparent to Noel Buxton's 
biographer, as has already been suggested. (40) One 
could, of course, argue that all this was merely a 
legitimation of the status quo, but this would be to
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disregard the very real concerns that were experienced 
by the management. They wanted to maintain the 
profitability of the company which was the basis of 
their wealth. In the late nineteenth century, two of 
the lesser figures in the dynasties (John Henry Buxton 
and Robert Hanbury) were recorded as half millionaires. 
(41) It therefore seems likely that at least some of 
the twelve London millionaires would have come from 
within the company. Simultaneously, that wealth had 
engendered a sense of duty in members of the families 
so that many of them were impelled to pursue a variety 
of philanthropic and political careers. For those that 
worked in the brewery, that sense of moral obligation 
and duty were no less.
What is clear is that in spite of the 
contemporary debates about the nature of management, 
and indeed, in spite of the fact that the Directors 
were aware of at least some parts of that debate, they 
did not really utilise any of these prevailing ideas. 
There are no indications that the Directors would have 
had much sympathy with Cadbury' view that whilst 
co-operation between employer and employee could be 
fostered in order to improve business efficiency, this 
should not be done at the expense of "the loyalty of 
the worker to his own class and organisation." (42) 
Trumans continued to exercise the paternalistic 
attitudes and practices that would have been entirely 
familiar to their predecessors with no really
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significant adaptations to meet the changing 
circumstances of the early twentieth century. They were 
prepared to listen to the respectful requests of the 
workforce, but in no sense to treat them as equals. In 
some respects what was on offer was authoritarian, 
implying the existence of a deferential relationship 
between employer and employee, which harked back to the 
practices of the early nineteenth century. There were 
elements though that were voluntary and these seem, at 
least in the longer term, to have been well supported 
by the workforce, suggesting that they were complaisant 
in what was being offered to them. At Trumans, the only 
surviving records all reiterate the theme of respect 
for the employers. It seems unlikely that this was the 
case on all occasions, but it nonetheless seems 
probable that on balance, the workforce would have 
shared the feelings expressed by the brewery workers of 
Carlisle after the effective nationalisation of brewing 
in that area: "for some time past they have been making 
unfavourable comparisons between the interest which the 
private employer took in the old workers and the 
indifference with which the Government treats them." 
(43)
In the course of this chapter an attempt has been 
made to identify the range of provision of non-monetary 
renumeration and to examine the extent to which 
paternalism determined this provision. Such a survey 
fulfills Melling's empirical and purportive approaches.
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In terms of his functional view of welfare provision, 
Trumans policies limited the influence of trade unions 
and created a consensual environment in which the 
workforce closely identified their interests with those 
of the company. This enabled the company to operate 
effectively and efficiently in the market conditions 
that prevailed, thus maximising its profitability.
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CHAPTER y - WORK OF EMPLOYED MANAGEMENT
Chandler has identified three broad categories of 
managerial control within British industry in the first 
half of the twentieth century. (1) Firstly, there were 
those which he classified as personal enterprises, 
which were administered without the benefit of an 
extensive managerial hierarchy. Secondly, there were 
those which he termed 'entrepreneurial' or family 
controlled, where the founder or the founder's heirs 
recruited management hierarchies while continuing to be 
influential stockholders and senior executives. 
Finally, there were those companies in which there were 
few links between the founders and those who managed 
the company. In order to reach this conclusion. 
Chandler studied a number of specific companies. His 
findings with regard to family firms suggest that 
Trumans was typical of many firms operating within the 
branded, packaged product and brewing trades at this 
time.
It was the Board of Directors which took all 
executive decisions pertaining to the running of the 
company and individual members often concerned 
themselves with some of the most mundane aspects of che 
company's administration, so that they frequently 
operated at middle management level. There was 
additionally a hierarchy of employed clerical and 
managerial staff to support them. Typically, this would 
mean that "each department was managed by one or more
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partners, usually from the founding family or families, 
together with a salaried specialist in the departmental
I
function, such as Head Brewer, Head Clerk or Head of 
Malt and Maltings." (2) It is to an examination of the 
most senior levels of the paid administration that 
attention will now be directed. This will involve
surveying the main responsibilities of three discrete
elements, namely the General Manager, the Works Manager 
and the Heads of Departments.
The senior managerial post was that of General 
Manager. The importance of this in the company
hierarchy can be gauged from the fact that the 
incumbent earned more than the fee paid to the highest 
paid Director; for instance, in 1913 the General
Manager earned £2,500, while in the following year, the 
highest paid Director was earning £1,550. Indeed, the 
General Manager's assistant, on a wage of £1,300 in 
1914 was earning exactly the same amount as the second 
highest paid Director. (3) In the inter-war period, the 
post was held successively by T.F. Reeve, until ill 
health forced his retirement at the age of eighty in 
1919, George King until 1929 and finally H. Malien. 
These three men had a number of characteristics in 
common. All had worked for the company from an early 
age; Reeve had joined at fourteen and King at 
seventeen. Malien's career is less easy to track as he 
was employed at Burton until 1929, and presumably that 
was where the records pertaining to that part of his
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employment were lodged. However, in view of the fact
that he was employed by the company for a total of
/
sixty-six years, he too must have started work for 
Trumans in his teens. All had worked for Trumans for 
more than thirty years before their elevation to this 
post and had worked their way through a variety of more 
junior posts. This can be illustrated by charting 
King's career:
Table I - Time line to show the main developments in 
George King's career
Annual
Year Position held salary
(where available)
1876 Junior clerk in the Counting House £70
1880 Temporary help at Burton (where
Reeve was Manager at the time) £100
1881 Clerk in the Counting House £110
1885 Abraod Clerk £200
1886 Assistant to the Head of Beershop £300
1890 Eastern Collector £365
1891 Eastern Abroad Clerk -
1912 Reeves' assistant (taking over an
increasing amount of Reeves' work
due to his ill health £1,000
1919 General Manager £2,500
(4)
The background of all three of these men, and 
indeed, of the vast majority of the paid management, 
illustrates the nature of the 'gentlemen and players' 
split that was identified by Chandler. (5) To sit on 
the Board, one had to be a member of one of the
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families, and the likely background would be a 
university education followed by a period of practical 
experience at either Brick Lane or Burton. Middle 
management would be drawn from men who might have 
received a practical training through a professional 
society or exceptionally through university and who 
additionally would have served a long period of 
on-the-job training with the company. Their loyalty to 
the company was therefore assured, and although they 
were merely 'players' the 'gentlemen' could expect them 
to emulate their attitudes.
The main functions of the General manager were on 
the financial and capital side of the brewing process. 
Thus, it was the General Manager of the day, Alexander 
Fraser, who was responsible for negotiating the
purchase of the Burton brewery in the 1870s and the 
dissolution of the partnership together with the 
flotation of the company in the 1880s. That the General 
Manager had a fair degree of discretion in such matters 
is implied by H.F. Buxton in a letter to E.N. Buxton 
when the purchase of the Maldon brewery was being 
contemplated. Whilst a group of Directors, together
with the Works Manager went to look at the properties 
and the brewery, Malien was involved in a discussion 
with Collins. (6) The context of the letter suggests
that Collins was either the person responsible for the 
sale of the Maldon brewery or a representative of the 
company's bank. In either case, Malien's private
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consultation with such a person is a good indicator of 
the^  degree of autonomy that the General Manager had.
It was the General Manager who was responsible 
for ensuring that at all times there were adequate 
supplies in stock and on order to enable production to 
continue uninterrupted. He also had to be fully 
conversant with all legislation and regulations 
pertaining to the industry and ensure that these were 
complied with. In order to facilitate this, he would on 
occasions represent the company in discussions with 
other breweries. In 1909, for example, it was T.F. 
Reeve who represented Trumans at a meeting of the seven 
main London brewers, where other breweries were 
represented by members of their Boards of Directors. 
The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the state of 
the trade in London and to propose solutions to its 
problems. In the event, no firm decisions were taken, 
but Reeve's very presence at the meeting is a further 
indicator of the degree of autonomy he had.
Although the foregoing marks the real extent of 
the responsibilities of the General Manager, if they 
needed to act in other areas, it is clear that they did
so. Thus, in 1911, when draymen arriving for work at
5am decided to go on strike, on their return at 11am to 
see members of the Board of Directors about their 
grievances, it was Reeve, rather than one of the three 
young and inexperienced Board members who were on site
who spoke to them. He got them to return to work at
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that time by promising that when more Directors were on 
site, their grievances would be examined. Thé fact that 
the men were prepared to return to work on the basis of 
this promise indicates that they believed that Reeve 
would keep his word, as indeed he did. (7)
It is apparent that the General Manager had a 
close working relationship with members of the Board of 
Directors. At the age of eighty-seven. Reeve was 
receiving letters from the the Chairman of the company 
and making suggestions to him about ways of altering 
the structure of shareholders. (8) In the
Correspondence Folder at the LCC, which contains almost 
exclusively family material, is to be found one funeral 
card - that of T.F. Reeve. It was a former General 
Manager also who became the first person outside of the 
three families to sit on the Board, although H. Malien 
did not achieve this until 1954. Yet one should not
assume from this that the General Manager was 
all-powerful. In 1926, King's nephew, Cecil applied for 
a post as a junior clerk. It might seem that his 
appointment, particularly as his father had also been 
employed at the brewery as Storehouse Manager, would 
have been a foregone conclusion. Of course, it is 
equally possible, that the management might have been 
sensitive to potential charges of nepotism. On this 
occasion at any rate, Cecil King was not employed by 
the Staff Director responsible for the appointment,
H.F. Buxton, although he was employed by the company at
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a subsequent attempt.
The managerial position that had the main
f
responsibility for personnel was the Works Manager..For 
the vast majority of the inter-war period (1921 - 1947) 
this position was held by F.H. Jeacock. He had first 
been employed in the brewery in April 1897 in the Works 
Office, having been introduced there by J.M. Hanbury 
"who had observed the young engineer's ability in his 
native county of Warwickshire," (9) where he had worked 
for Kibler and Company, a building firm, until the age 
of twenty-three. By 1900, he had been made up the 
position of Second Engineer and the comments in the 
wages book suggest that a very high opinion was held of 
his abilities, so that by 1907 he had advanced to the 
post of Engineer. There is a gap in his appearance in 
the records between 1907 and 1920, but when he 
reappears in 1920 it is as Assistant Manager at a 
salary of £2,500 per annum, a considerable rise from 
his last appearance in 1907 when he was earning £350 
per annum. In 1921, he took on the post of Works 
Manager, which in addition to running the Works 
Department, involved brewery-wide responsibilities.
As has already been indicated, he was involved 
very much more directly with the personnel side of 
management than was the General Manager. His 
responsibilities included arranging for the appointment 
of new employees and the promotion of existing 
employees on the shop floor. After employees had been
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medically examined at the end of their first six months 
of ^employment, it would be Jeacock, generally in 
consultation with a member of the Board, who would make 
the decisions in marginal cases. In December 1926, for 
example, it was Jeacock and H.F. Buxton who decided not 
to employ a marginal candidate, whilst in 1936, with 
J.A. Pryor and James Stenhouse, the Head Brewer, it was 
decided that a brewer who was seeking early retirement 
on medical grounds was not as unhealthy as he himself 
believed and so should be told to stay. (10) With the 
co-operation of the foremen he supervised the work that 
went on; he was involved in early forms of time and 
motion study in order to maximise output and hence 
profitability; he kept a check on illness and accidents 
so that information could be passed on to members of 
the Board of Directors on the basis of which they could 
make their decisions as to pensions and gratuities; he 
occasionally examined the various methods of wage 
payment which were in operation at the brewery (hourly, 
weekly and piece rate), in order to ensure that the 
most effective method in any given situation was in 
use. This would be judged both on the basis of cost 
efficiency and the general satisfaction of the labour 
force. Thus, in 1920, the piece rate element of the 
draymen's wages was replaced by a flat rate overtime 
payment at their request, although this later reverted 
to the piece rate payment, again at their request.
Generally, the Works Manager was prepared to take
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advice from anyone who was competent to have an
I
opinion, so for example, in 1911, he had attended a 
meeting of the Engineers' Society in order to discuss 
the prevailing rates of pay. (11) In the final analysis 
though, he appreciated that he had to distill the 
various views he heard expressed and present 
recommendations to the Board for their consideration. 
In his own words, "after discussion, the Works Manager 
must be in a position to give a report to his Directors 
based on all points that have been under discussion, 
and obtain from them a decision." (12) This suggests 
that the ultimate responsibility for making decisions 
lay with the Board, although they were likely to be 
influenced by him, particularly in view of his long 
experience with the company. He also acted as an 
intermediary between the Board of Directors and the 
Heads of Departments in relaying information about the 
decisions that had been made by the Board. Each Head of 
Department kept what was called the Directors' Order 
Book into which memoranda that affected all employees 
together with those which affected only those who 
worked in their department were stuck. In virtually 
every case, these memoranda were not signed by a Board 
member, but by Jeacock.
These Directors' Order Books contained not merely 
the decisions of the Board relating to such issues as 
wages, holidays, sick pay and general regulations 
concerning the running of the brewery, but also any
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legislative issues that impinged on the workforce. They 
were thus a valuable aid to the third element of
t
management in pursuing the policies that had been laid 
down by both the Government and the Board. There were 
five main Heads of Department, although their relative 
importance varied and was reflected in different salary 
structures. In 1923, the Board had decided that it 
would be useful to have monthly meetings of the Heads 
of Departments at which Jeacock would also be present.' 
In this way matters of common concern could be 
discussed and appropriate solutions could be suggested. 
Jeacock would then be responsible for reporting back to 
the Board what had gone at these meetings, and they, in 
their turn could take any necessary decisions. It 
appears that this system worked reasonably well, as is 
indicated by the following memorandum attached to one 
of the Directors' Order Books: "The attached report on 
wages to be paid to men as agreed by Stenhouse, Smith, 
Inman, Marsden, Critchley and F.H. Jeacock was 
presented to the Board on December 13th 1933 and the 
proposals therein agreed to." (13) In spite of the 
influence that this group had with the Board, there 
were nonetheless limits to what they could do. Just as 
they supervised what went on in their departments, so 
the Board supervised their work, which included a 
directive issued in 1939 that their group lunches 
should end no later than 2.15pm. (14)
The most important of the Heads of Department was
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the Head Brewer. This post was held from 1904 to 1938 
by James Stenhouse. He had been educated at Watson
I
College, Edinburgh, trained at the Central Institute, 
South Kensington and employed by W.J. Rogers of Bristol 
and Flowers and Sons of Stratford before joining 
Trumans as the Second Brewer at Burton in 1897, from 
which post he progressed to Burton Head Brewer in 1900 
and London Head Brewer in 1904. His individual 
responsibilities in this post included supervising the 
brew and if there were any problems in any of the 
resulting gyles (brews), discerning the causes of them. 
In order to facilitate these functions, he lived in 
company property adjacent to Brick Lane. He was also 
involved in decisions regarding changes to the amounts 
of raw materials or gravity of the beer, both of which 
would alter the taste. Thus, he was included in a one 
and a half hour meeting along with a brewing expert and 
three Directors in an attempt to come up with a taste 
that would have an appeal in the East End of London at 
a time when consumption in that area was on the 
decline. (15) He would also be a party to any decisions 
regarding the purchase of additional breweries, and for 
that reason accompanied the Directors who visited the 
Maldon brewery in 1930. Periodically, he would meet 
with the Head Brewers of other breweries in order to 
make sure that any common problems might . be resolved 
through common solutions, as for instance, in the case 
of discussing the level of wages that should be offered
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throughout London to brewers. (16) This was a
particularly pressing problem at this point because the
!
advent of war had "cheated (brewers) of one of their 
best weapons of defence, namely, the right to employ 
other men in place of those who decide to go on 
strike." (17) This had led to increased union strength, 
a development that was not especially welcome to the 
majority of brewers. The situation was further 
exacerbated by the fact that the industry had been put- 
under the control of the Central Control Board in June 
1915. It seems likely therefore that the brewery owners 
felt that they were being assailed from all sides, and 
that this was merely one response amongst many. 
Finally, it seems likely that in an indirect way, the 
Board of Directors would have seen Stenhouse as acting 
as an ambassador for the good name of the brewery - 
amongst the many external positions he held, with both 
the approval and the support of the Board, were 
President of the Institute of Brewing, Chairman of the 
Research Fund of the Brewers' Institute, member of the 
Consultative Committee for the Fermentation Industries 
and member of the Board of Management of the British 
School of Malting and Brewing at Birmingham University.
One of the most important trends in the brewing 
industry in the inter-war years was the massive 
expansion in the production of bottled beer. At 
Trumans, as at other breweries, the consequence of this 
expansion was to have important effects within the
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brewery. It led firstly to a growth in the number of 
people employed in that department: from 98 in 1920 to
I
429 in 1936. In order to accomodate this expansion a 
building programme had to be undertaken; bottling had 
begun in a small way at Coverley Fields, a site about a 
quarter of a mile away from the main brewery, but the 
expansion in production soon led to the purchase of 
additional depots around the country and the 
centralisation of production on the Brick Lane site had 
occurred by 1913. In order to bottle efficiently, new 
machinery had to be purchased, thus involving the 
company in an important capital expenditure. The 
changes that were taking place in the bottling 
processes were reflected in the changes that took place 
in its management.
When D.L. Donald was promoted to the Head of 
Bottling in 1898, he had overall control, but as the 
work began to expand, so it was decided to split the 
areas of responsibility into two elements. Donald 
continued to have overall control, but was specifically 
responsible for sales; he organised the visits that 
were made into the trade, ensured that adequate 
supplies of beer were available at all times for 
bottling, arranged for the delivery of bottled beer to 
the depots and for the return of empty bottles to Brick 
Lane. To supervise the actual daily working of the 
factory floor, F.L. Browne was promoted. Donald retired 
in 1924 and there is no record of who replaced him.
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Browne continued in his position of Bottling Stores 
Factory Manager until 1932, when he was promoted to the
I
the position that had been held by Donald prior to 
1924. In his place, F.J. Critchley was appointed. It is 
clear from the relative salaries earned by the two 
positions that the Head of Bottling was the more 
important, but no indications are given about the way 
in which the two posts interacted in terms of a chain 
of management command.
The other three Heads of Department were J.V. 
Inman at the Storehouse from 1919 until at least 1936, 
W. Marsden at the Cooperage from 1920 until at least 
1936 and W.T. Smith at the Beershop from 1920 until 
1938. Of these three, the first two were of 
considerably less significance, as is reflected in 
their renumeration, indicated in table II. Smith, in 
addition to his post was also Second Brewer, which 
meant that he had to substitute for Stenhouse whenever 
required. There are virtually no references to the work 
that these three men did and one can only assume that 
in common with the other two Department Heads, they 
were responsible for keeping the relevant Director 
informed about what was going on, that they organised 
the day-to-day running of their department and made the 
necessary decisions regarding both the ordering of raw 
materials, stock or equipment and the work carried out 
by the labour force, subject of course, to the orders 
that had been transmitted to them from the Board of
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Table II Wages of Heads of Department 1920 -
Name 1920 1930 1936
1
Stenhouse £2,200 £2,750 £3000
Donald £1,200 Retired
Browne £850 £1,250 £1,250
Critchley Working in brewery as clerk £800
Inman £800 £820 £820
Marsden £850 £820 £820
Smith £700 £1,300 £1,650
(18)
Directors via Jeacock. There were further small 
departments such as the Wharf, but the Heads of these 
Departments were not involved in any significant way in 
the management of the brewery beyond their role within 
their own departments.
It is clear that the Board of Directors was a 
working Board that took a direct interest in the 
running of the brewery. There is much evidence that 
Board members were frequently on the premises. The 
Monthly Reports show that F.L. Browne had to meet the 
Director with responsibility for Bottling every 
morning, and it seems likely that this was a practice 
that was replicated in other departments. On the death 
of J.M. Hanbury, his unexpired season ticket from 
Chelmsford to London was returned to the Great Eastern 
Railway Company with the request that it should be 
re-issued in the name of his widow, Christine. (19) 
That both of these Hanbury Board members regarded it as
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worthwhile to invest in a season ticket suggests very 
regular attendance at the brewery. Similarly, the 
instruction that the flow in the gas tank of Number 18 
cellar could not be altered "without the sanction of 
Mr. Dent or Mr. Peter Pryor" (20) implies that at least 
one of them was always available.
The Board addressed itself to a wide range of 
matters which encompassed every aspect of life within 
the brewery, and for many of their employees touched on 
their domestic lives too. This ranged from significant 
decisions, such as the terms of agreements to be made 
with trade unions on the question of minimum wages in 
April 1920 or the setting aside of a large amount of 
money for the pension fund in December 1926 through 
what might be regarded as middle management decision 
making, such as the need to engage a new chemist in 
February 1930 or for all public house signposts to be 
varnished in November 1930, through to the most trivial 
matters such as donating five shillings to the Indigent 
Blind Fund of 1930. (21) As Payne has pointed out, "in 
brewing, the perpetuation of family control remained a 
major desideratum," (22) and this can clearly be seen 
in the way in which the Trumans/ Board concerned itself 
with all aspects of the running of the brewery. It was 
this concern with the minutiae of the business that 
characterises the authoritarian paternalism that is 
associated with many breweries, including Trumans.
Thus, as in many other British companies that
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were dominated by family management, "senior executives 
worked closely in the same office building, having
I
almost daily personal contact with, and thus directly 
supervising, middle and often lower level managers." 
(23) Although decision-making was the perogative of the 
Directors, they were dependent on the expertise of 
those whom they employed; they were prepared to listen 
to reasoned argument and if they felt unable to make 
immediate decisions, they would defer judgement until* 
they had approached a number of experts and sought 
their advice. That the ultimate decisions were theirs 
is evident, as is the fact that they did invilve 
themselves in the daily routine running of the company. 
They set down guidelines for their senior management to 
operate within, but as long as those guidelines were 
adhered to, they allowed some autonomy of action. They 
seem also to have been conscious of the need to make 
explicit the status of their managers; when Browne was 
promoted to Head of the Bottling Factory, the Monthly 
Reports noted that "all instructions to be given by 
him, (24) presumably because the division of the 
Department had made the limits of responsibility for 
each manager unclear.
Both the General Manager and the Works Manager 
would be involved in discussions relating to their area 
of competence with either the relevant individual 
member of the Board or with the Board as a body. The 
Works Manager would act as an intermediary between the
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Board and the Heads of Departments when both were 
acting as a body, but individual Heads of Departments 
had direct dealings with the individual Directors who 
had specific responsibility for their area and were 
likely to meet them on a regular basis, and in at least 
one case, on a daily basis. Beyond this, it is 
difficult to reconstruct the exact relationships that 
existed within the chain of the management hierarchy. 
Although there is abundant surviving material on the 
decisions that were made and the work that was carried 
out by various members of the Board and paid 
management, it is clear that much of what went on was 
the continuance of existing practice, and as such, 
there was little need to make explicit what it 
involved. As Chandler points out on several occasions 
in slightly different forms; "such enterprises had no 
need for the detailed organisation charts and manuals 
that had come into common use in large American and 
German firms before 1914;" (25) in a well-established 
company in which the founding families retained 
control, all members of the management and of the 
workforce knew exactly what their relationship to other 
parts of the company were without having consciously to 
articulate it. Based on the available sources, figure 
II attempts to reconstruct the main lines of management 
communication.
It aims to make explicit a number of the issues 
that have been raised with regard to the nature of the
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Figure II - Main channels of management communication
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the management hierarchy at Trumans. It shows a three 
tier level of management, with the Board of Directors 
at the top. They are clearly not involved merely in the 
making of strategic decisions. Not only did they not 
leave the daily running of the brewery to their senior 
management (the General Manager and the Works Manager), 
but they did not leave the running of the individual 
departments to the Heads of Departments under the 
direction of the Works Manager. This structure was one 
that had not changed dramatically since the nineteenth 
century, for although the brewery had experienced 
changes in production, all of these had occured in such 
a way that the existing structure could accomodate 
them. In key respects this hierarchy conforms to 
Chandler's first category of organisation. Namely, 
management was conducted without the benefit of an 
extensive managerial hierarchy. This is not especially
1 0 9
surprising, for the companies that Chandler classifies 
in this particular way share a number of common 
characteristics with Trumans. The majority of packaged, 
branded goods fall into this category, many of which 
share the Quaker/evangelical background of Trumans, but 
aditionally, most breweries examined by Chandler also 
exhibit this type of hierarchy. It therefore seems 
logical to conclude that the key variable in 
determining the managerial style of Trumans was the 
actual product, with its capital intensive nature. 
Religion must have been less significant, for the 
majority of brewers were not rooted in that tradition. 
However, the writings of individual members of the 
families make it clear that many of them perceived 
their actions as being governed by that 
religious/philanthropic dimension.
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CHAPTER VI - THE WORK OF THE BREWERY 
' I - introduction
The purpose of the next three chapters is to 
outline the main stages in the production, packaging 
and distribution of beer by Truman, Hanbury and Buxton 
in the inter-war period, indicating the work that was 
done at various stages by different groups of workers. 
Within this structure, some indications will be given 
of the internal hierarchies which existed and the ways 
in which movement within these was available to 
individual members of the workforce. In attempting to 
reconstruct such patterns, considerable use was made of 
the variety of statistical materials deposited at the 
GLC Record Office. In view of the plethora of material 
available, it was decided at a very early stage in this
enquiry to focus on three specific years, rather than
to try to look at all the inter-war material. This 
choice was to some extent governed by the materials, 
with some years having fewer resources than others. The 
three years finally selected were 1914, 1920 and 1936. 
Within the constraints of availability, the reasons for 
these choices were as follows. Firstly, 1914 was
selected in order to give a pre-war perspective so that
it would be possible to identify any significant 
changes that occured in either the brewing industry or 
the company during the war. Secondly, 1920 was selected 
to give the post-war situation . once the demobilised 
soldiers had, for the most part, returned to their
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peace-time occupations. Thirdly, 1936 was selected as 
representing a period when the worst effects of the 
depression had receded. The concentration on these
three years does not mean that there are no references
to other years in these chapters, but that these three 
years will figure more prominently than any others.
Despite the variety of occupations that will be 
examined in these chapters, two prevailing and 
significantly different patterns of employment will be 
identified as occuring within the company. One is
associated with those workers whose only skill was
their physical strength and the other is associated 
with those who possessed a developed craft skill. 
Despite this skill, and hence wage differential, it 
will further be shown that in at least two key areas of 
the working of the company, there were not profound 
differences between the different types of occupational 
category. The first of these was the degree of worker 
loyalty, by whatever means it was engendered. The 
second was the existence of a clear pattern of career 
progression through the company, which can be discerned 
from a study of the career histories of large numbers 
of the workforce based on a range of wage records. The 
existence of this pattern was not explicitly identified 
by the management in their records. This may simply be 
because that, like the functioning of the management 
hierarchy, the sytem was understood by all who were 
involved, without the need for explicit articulation.
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Nonetheless, the system clearly operated as an internal 
job ladder and could therefore potentially be regarded 
as a functional instrument of labour control, even if 
this were not the actual intention of the management.
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II - Beer production
'The main Trumans mailings were located at Long 
Melford in Suffolk, although there were others at 
Sudbury and Lavenham. Barley would have been selected 
from local merchants, usually by the London Head 
Brewer, who would often have been accompanied by the 
Brewing Director. The process of converting barley into 
malt is a fairly lengthy and complex procedure. The way 
in which the process proceeded was that the barley was 
dried and screened to remove foreign corns, small 
grains and dust. It would then be stored for a period 
of at least five to six weeks before being tipped into 
steeps, which were large tanks filled with water. It 
would be left in these for a period of forty-eight to 
sixty hours while it germinated. At the end of that 
process, it would be tipped and spread onto one of the 
three floors at the malt house, to a depth determined 
by a Foreman Maltster which would be conditional on the 
state of the weather (the colder it was, the deeper the 
barley had to lie). After a further twenty-four hours, 
the malt would be thinned out using wooden shovels, 
which helped to encourage root growth to begin within 
the next twenty-four hours. Over the ensuing four to 
five days, it would be turned regularly to reduce heat 
build-up and to increase air circulation, thereby 
removing carbon dioxide. The green malt would then be 
shovelled into a kiln. The heat in the kiln would be 
gradually raised in order to complete the process and
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reduce the moisture, which contributed to the arrest of 
the growth of the shoots and the withering of the 
roots. Malt that was intended for use in stouts and 
milds would be given a longer roasting than that which 
was used in pale ales, for it was malt that gave the 
dark beers their distinctive flavour. From the kiln, 
the malt was taken to a hopper for one final screening 
to remove the withered roots and dust before being 
stored in large bins for five to six weeks. The men 
involved in this work do not show up in the Trumans 
wages books because they were employed locally and on a 
seasonal basis. Nonetheless, the work that they 
performed was central to the operation of the brewery 
and represented its most costly element in terms of raw 
materials.
When it was finally ready, the malt would be 
transported to the brewery, where it would be stored in 
bins in the Malt Loft, according to place of origin, 
until it was required. Those employed in the Malt Loft 
were always small in number, rising to a maximum of 
seven in 1936, their growth in numbers coinciding with 
a general growth in the numbers employed in the 
Brewers' Department in order to meet the expanding 
demands of the Bottling Department. The day before a 
new brew was made, the operative brewer in charge of it 
would come to the Malt Loft to select the appropriate 
malt. The work of those employed in this area was to 
take the malt from the bins, either by suction plant or
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by archimedean screw and to screen, weigh and finally 
grind' it in the Mill Room. By the end of this process, 
grist would have been produced and would be stored in 
grist cases, ready for use. The men who worked in the 
Malt Loft came under the aegis of the Brewers' 
Department. For the ordinary labourers, their wages 
were comparable to those being earned by other general 
labourers in the Brewers' Department. There were, 
however, two important differences between Malt Loft 
labourers and general Brewers' labourers.
Firstly, those who were taken on to work in the 
Malt Loft in times o5 good trade, were more likely to 
remain as 'odd' men than those taken on in the Ale and 
Porter Tun Rooms; that is, they were more likely to 
remain on the books as temporary labourers, rather than 
to be made up to permanent members of the workforce. 
This meant that when trade was bad, little attempt 
would be made to protect their jobs. This situation was 
the result of a conscious strategy by the Board of 
Directors. In hard times, their aim was to keep on all 
members of their permanent workforce. By creating an 
area where those employed were all temporary, this 
group of workers could be laid off and members of the 
permanent workforce deployed there. (1) Such a strategy 
was widespread; Littler identifies it as part of a 
minimum interaction strategy, which was generally 
associated with firms which used close supervision, 
simple wage systems and rudimentary benefit packages.
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(2) Secondly, in addition to the basic wage, there was 
an element of piece-work bonus paid for the work that 
was done grinding, weighing and working on the vacuum 
plant: in 1926, for example, the additional payments to 
two of the men working there amounted to four shillings 
and five shillings respectively. Such additional 
payments might be made to some general Brewers' 
labourers who took on special responsibilities, but 
they were less general among the general labourers than 
they were among the Malt Loft labourers. It seems 
possible that these two differences were connected; 
that in order to compensate the labourers for the 
vulnerability of their position, a mechanism was in 
place to enable them to achieve slightly higher wages 
on those occasions when they were employed.
The direct supervision of the work was carried 
out by an individual who at various times was referred 
to either as 'Foreman' or 'leading man' or 'in charge 
of gang'. It is hardly surprising that there should be 
some linguistic ambiguity about the status of the man 
in charge of this department. It was after all, small 
and generally comprised of temporary labourers. 
Promotion to the post was relatively easy, both in view 
of the size of the department and the nature of the 
conditions under which the labourers were employed. 
Thus, any worker who was transferred from the temporary 
labour force of the department onto the permanent books 
was likely to be able to achieve promotion, even if
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this took a number of years. This can be illustrated by 
looking at the careers of two members of the 
department.
Case Study I - Malt Loft
Year Position weekly wage
1901 Started work in the Malt Loft as
an 'odd' man, aged twenty-four £1-04-0
1921 Deputy Malt Loft £3-16-0
1923 Leading man on Malt Loft £3-13-0
1930 No longer acting Foreman £4-00-0
1936 Still employed in Malt Loft £4-00-0
Case Study II - Malt Loft 
1919 Started work in the Malt Loft as
an 'odd' man, aged seventeen £2-00-0
1938 Leading hand £4-03-0
(3)
Case study I gaves a further clue to the nature 
of the work that was carried out in this department. In 
exactly the same way as his predecessor, this Foreman 
was made down from the position a number of years 
before he left the employ of the company. This seems to 
be the only department in the brewery where this 
phenomenon occurred. It seems likely that this was the 
consequence of the inability of a man in late middle 
age simultaneously to undertake supervisory duties 
accompanied by heavy manual ' labour, a situation that 
was the norm in this department because of the small 
number of workers employed. Hannah has pointed out that 
this type of downward movement was no rare thing; "In
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many manual occupations, earnings peaked at age 
forty-five and after that it was increasingly difficult 
to find new employment; from age fifty-five men 
frequently had to drop skilled occupations entirely,"
(4) which in those companies Hannah examined was 
generally accompanied by a cut in wages. Trumans was an 
exception to this pattern. Although in both of these 
cases, the individuals no longer carried out the 
'skilled' work of supervision that had led to an 
additional payment, they did not lose that payment once 
they dropped the occupation. This reinforces earlier 
remarks about the strategies employed by the management 
to create a sense of worker loyalty. Such a tangible 
sign of concern was likely to contribute to the longer 
term commitment of the Foreman, secure in the knowledge 
of his own likely future treatment. It would also, in a 
more indirect way, serve to motivate others employed 
elsewhere in the brewery by demonstrating employer 
loyalty on the part of the management. In this way, a 
functional element of control was being exercised at a 
cost of less than forty pounds per annum (the 
approximate difference between what a Foreman and a 
hand would have been paid). The management itself, 
however, would probably have seen its actions in terms 
of its concern for the human element in business that 
derived from its traditional approach.
The next stage of the brewing process was one 
that required very little judgement. When the stokers
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arrived to begin their shift at 5.45am, they would heat 
the liquor (water) which had been pumped up from a bore 
hole drilled eight hundred and forty-five feet deep 
into London's artesian basin in 1910. The water from 
here had a high carbonate level, making it eminently 
suitable for the production of brown ale, porter and 
stout. It could not be used to make pale ale of the 
Burton type until after 1927, when Charrington's found 
that by the addition of magnesium sulphate, gypsum and 
lime, the water could be hardened. The grist was fed 
into the top of a Steel's mashing machine into which 
hot liquor would be injected. The grist and liquor 
would be agitated together within the machine and the 
resultant mash would run into mash tuns, with the 
stoker ensuring that the correct temperature was 
maintained at all times. The remaining workers within 
this department would begin their shift at 6.30am, by 
which time, the mashing would be close to completion. 
The mash would be left in the mash tuns for between one 
and a half and two hours in order to convert the starch 
that was contained in the malt into sugar, which would 
be used at a subsequent stage of the brewing process. 
At this point, the malt extract, which was called the 
wort, was drawn off through the bottom of the tuns at 
the rate of one hundred and twenty barrels per hour and 
pumped into the coppers. The mash was sparged (sprayed 
with hot liquor) to flush out all the wort, whilst the 
residual spent grains from the mash tuns would be sold
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on, eventually to be used as cattle feed.
 ^The coppers were located in different areas 
depending on what type of beer would ultimately be 
produced in them; some in the Ale Tun Room and some in 
the porter Tun Room. The men who were employed in this 
process of moving the beer to the appropriate place 
were known as stage workers. Like all the utensils that 
were used in the brewing process, the coppers had to be 
kept meticulously clean in order to enable the correct 
chemical reaction to take place. In 1913, there was one 
labourer whose job was classified as 'copper scourer'. 
He earned a basic weekly wage of £1-9-0, together with 
an additional bonus of two shillings when there was no 
work as a copper scourer available, when he would be 
put to racking. This combined wage was the same as that 
received by other general labourers within the Tun 
Rooms, and as this specific job description did not 
appear again, it can only be assumed that this work was 
subsumed within the normal duties of the workforce. Not 
all cleaning work was subsumed in this way. In 1927, 
for example, one of the general labourers was awarded a 
weekly bonus of three shillings because he had been put 
in charge of mains cleaning, a bonus that had risen to 
twelve shillings by 1937, a clear indication of the 
degree of importance that the management attached to 
this activity.
At this point the operative brewer would play a 
central role in the production process through his
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decision regarding exactly how much sugar and hops to 
add ' to the brew. Such operative brewers were 
"managerial" as opposed to "manual", but in view of 
their direct involvement in the brewing process, it was 
felt that this was a more appropriate place to examine 
their role. The operative brewer would have received a 
formal education, which might have included a 
university training, but which at the very least would 
have involved attendance at some form of technical 
training. In London, the Sir John Cass Technical 
Institute, at which some of the Trumans' operative 
brewers gave occasional lectures, provided such 
technical training. In addition to James Stenhouse, the 
Head Brewer and W.T. Smith, the Second Brewer, there 
were six operative brewers. It is clear that such men 
regarded themselves as professionals: "his training had 
to be as comprehensive and thorough as that of any of 
the recognised professions," but there was a general 
feeling that they were not accorded that position: "yet 
he was generally not regarded as belonging to that 
status." (5)
It was the opinion of this group that their lack 
of status was reflected in the level of their 
renumeration: "after the 1914 - 18 War, there were
indications that while the salaries of other brewery 
employees had been substantially increased, the claims 
of the operative brewers had in many cases been 
overlooked." (6) In order to assess the validity of
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this assertion as far as Trumans is concerned, a
comparison will be made of three categories of workers 
- operative brewers, brewers and clerks - by looking at 
the increase in earnings of two workers within each 
category. This is clearly an imperfect measure for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, although in the choice of
worker category, an attempt was made to select both a
high-earning member and a typical member of the 
department, such a choice is clearly arbitrary, and the 
use of an atypical employee may therefore affect the 
findings. Secondly, the wages provided follow the 
position rather than an individual, so no account can 
be taken of any incremental increases. In spite of 
these problems, it should be possible to draw some
general, as opposed to specific, conclusions about any 
changes that took place in the relative position of 
operative brewers between 1913 and 1920.






Foreman (Best paid) 153
Labourer (average wage) 154
CLERKS
Wharf cooperage clerk 357
Surveyor 150
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It would appear on the basis of this table that 
the complaints being made by operative brewers in
i
general were well founded in reality as far as Trumans 
were concerned. Compared to both the salaried element 
of which they were part and the waged element with 
which they came into daily contact, their differential 
position was being squeezed. The reason for the rise 
among the former group is relatively straightforward. 
The combination of the development of collective 
bargaining and the impact of the Central Control Board 
were both likely to have played a role in the increase, 
although it is not possible to assess exactly what the 
relative importance of each was. The reason for the 
remarkable increase for the wharf cooperage clerk is 
not clear, but it is interesting to note that the 
percentage increase experienced by the surveyor closely 
tracked those of the brewers, which may well be more 
than mere coincidence.
Two factors must however be borne in mind. 
Firstly, there is no evidence that Trumans' operative 
brewers were amongst those who were complaining about 
their position. Secondly, even if on the basis of this 
evidence, it is felt likely that they were unhappy 
about their position, too simplistic a picture should 
not be drawn. A comparison of the actual annual 
earnings of each group in 1913 shows a very different 
picture: the Head Brewer was earning £2,000, the best 
paid Foreman was earning £130 and the wharf cooperage
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clerk was earning £70. Nor should it be forgotten that 
operative brewers received benefits other than cash 
wages as part of their renumeration. Company houses 
would be provided for all of them close by. Amongst the 
benefits were subsidised rents and coal. Unmarried men 
lived in a company provided hostel which laid on all 
food and domestic needs. In spite of these advantages, 
their skills were not transferrable and it is clear 
that dissatisfaction was pervasive throughout the 
industry as far as this group was concerned. It seems 
probable that had such dissatisfaction translated 
itself into conflict between this group and the 
management of the brewery, there would have been some 
reference made to it in the Directors' Minutes. In view 
of this lack of reference, it would appear that a 
general sense of dissatisfaction did not lead to 
conflict.
Sugar was added to supplement the natural sugars 
extracted from the malt in order to modify the flavour 
of the resultant beer. In 1923, one of the brewery 
labourers received an additional £1 in his Christmas 
present for the work he had done with the sachrometer, 
so although the amount of sugar added was determined by 
an operative brewer, it appears that it was possible 
for an unskilled worker to monitor the progress of the 
process. The sugar that was added was produced in 
Trumans' own sugar refinery from cane sugar for which 
they paid £38,000 in the year to Rest 1931. This was an
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unusual practice in a period when most brewers bought 
their' requirements direct from the sugar refiners, but 
there is no indication provided in the materials as to 
why Trumans pursued this policy. The work involved did 
not engage a worker full time, so some of the stage 
workers received additional weekly payments when they 
were emloyed working on the sugar floor (one shilling 
over and above normal rates in 1929).
The other raw material added at this stage was 
hops. The purpose of these were to act both as a 
preservative and to give the beer its distinctive 
flavour and aroma. In order to achieve this second aim, 
about one pound of hops would be added for the light 
beers which were produced in the Ale Tun Room and about 
three to four pounds for the dark beers which were 
produced in the Porter Tun Room. Part of the supply 
came from the company's own hop farm near Paddock Wood 
in Kent, where the workforce was employed locally and 
seasonally as the need dictated. Generally, further 
stocks had to be bought in; in the year to Rest 1931, 
this amounted to over £27,000. It seems likely that the 
purchase of a considerable amount of these stocks which 
were bought in was arranged through the firm of Pelly. 
A hop review meeting was mentioned as taking place 
between three of the Directors and Mr. Pelly, a hop 
merchant, in order to look at the state of the market 
and make the decision as to when to buy. (8) In view of 
the fact that one of E.N. Buxton's daughters had the
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married name of Pelly and that John Pelly, hop 
merchant, witnessed a codicil to E.N. Buxton's will, it 
seems likely that the Pellys would carry out a great 
deal of the work associated with the purchase of hops, 
being connected by marriage with the most influential 
of the three families who comprised the company. The 
decisions about when to buy became more straightforward 
after 1931, for the Agricultural Marketing Act of that 
year established quotas on the growing of hops which 
led to a price stabilisation.
The wort, hops and sugar were boiled together in 
the copper over a furnace of anthracite coal. In 1913 
and 1920, there.were workers whose specific designation 
was 'stoker' and who were responsible for this aspect 
of the work, but in 1921, their occupational 
classification within the brewery became 'stagemen', a 
term which had formerly referred to that group of 
workers who were associated with moving the wort around 
and carrying out the processes of the early stages of 
production, the name being derived from the gantry or 
stage around the mash tun. After 1921, this group known 
as 'stage men' subsumed the work previously done by 
both stokers and stage men. This appears to have given 
the management more flexibility in the way in which 
these workers could be moved around to work in 
different areas, although it is possible that it merely 
marked a change of job title rather than a profound 
change in the structure of the work.
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After the mixture had boiled in the copper for 
about'two hours it would be run by gravity into tanks 
called hopbacks which only let through the liquid 
hopped wort, holding back the spent hops, which would 
be sold for horticultural purposes. The hopped wort 
would then be pumped into the Ale or Porter Tun Rooms. 
It was this aspect of the production process that saw 
one of the principal technical changes of the period, 
although it is not clear precisely when it came into 
operation at Trumans. The cooling process "used to take 
place in flat, open tanks, a slow process and one 
involving the risk of airborne infection, but it is now 
generally carried out by running the wort over brine 
pipes in specially constructed chambers filled with 
pure air." (9) This particular improvement made it less 
likely for a brew to be spoiled and meant a reduction 
of about eight hours in the length of time the process 
took. In practice though, it made very little 
difference to the nature of the work being carried out 
by the labour force.
That the company would make use of any 
improvement that was likely to maximise its efficiency 
was a feature of its management commented upon by any 
number of apparently impartial observers. Rose being 
just one example among many: "This great business has 
grown in a haphazard fashion, highly typical of London, 
the most modern machinery being set behind walls of the 
early nineteenth century." (10) In spite of such
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praise, the overwhelming impression that is conveyed by 
the various sources is that any decision to make such 
changes to the brewing processes or indeed to other 
aspects of the running of the brewery was a long-term 
process. Trumans was not conservative - the Board was 
clearly prepared to make changes and to innovate, but 
they were not ahead of the field; they would wait and 
see whether such changes worked effectively before 
commiting themselves.
The liquid would leave the coolers at 60 degrees 
Fahrenheit and be pumped to the fermenting squares of 
the fermentationrooms. At this point the final reaction 
would be Induced by the introduction of yeast at the 
rate of one and a quarter pounds per barrel of wort. 
Samples would be taken from the fermenting squares 
every six hours under the supervision of a Foreman in 
order to measure the gravity of the beer. Generally, as 
the temperature of fermentation rose, the gravity 
would drop. This reaction, and hence the final strength 
of the beer could be modified using an attemperator 
which enabled "the brewer to check or accelerate the 
rate of fermentation by passing iced liquor at the 
desired speed through them." (11) During the normal day 
shift this work would be carried out by labourers who 
were classified either as Ale Tun Room workers or 
Porter Tun Room workers. They would receive an 
additional payment to their basic wage for this work, 
which in both 1913 and 1920 amounted to two shillings
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weekly. The knowledge to carry out this work was 
acquired in on-the-job training. Experienced men would 
show an inexperienced man who had been identified as 
being responsible how to monitor the reactions. In this 
way, those with no skill would develop what was 
regarded as a semi-skilled status within the hierarchy 
of the workplace. It is clear that this 'skill' was 
industry-specific and could not be transferred to 
another industry. In this way the management was 
further imposing a functional control on the labour 
force, although there is no suggestion that this was an 
overt strategy of labour control.
It is clear that the brew would have to be 
monitored at all times in order to prevent undesired 
reactions taking place in it, but the wage records 
suggest that only a skeleton gang would be employed on 
the night shift. In 1914, all the stokers would have to 
expect to be a part of this gang at some time, and this 
was reflected in a basic wage that was one shilling 
higher than that of other labourers in this department. 
Where ordinary labourers were called in to work the 
night shift, their basic rate would be supplemented and 
if they were called upon to work a Sunday, they would 
earn an additional fifteen shillings. This may mean 
that the practice identified by Booth as taking place 
in the London breweries in the earlier part of the 
century still persisted: "A gang can be summoned in at 
night to clean fermenting vessels if fermentation takes
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Table IV - Main shifts in the Brewers Department
Day. shift (all workers except the stokers who were to 
begin 45 minutes earlier and to finish at 3pm Monday to 
Friday, noon on Saturday, but were only ever to have a 
45 minute break in their day.)
Monday - Thursday 6.30am - 5pm
Friday 6.30am - 4.30pm
Saturday 6.30am - 12 noon
Night shift
Ale and porter refrigeration 
Monday to Thursday 2.15pm - 
Friday
Alternate Saturdays 6am - 
Stokers
Monday to Friday 2.30pm - 
Sunday lam
Fermentation men 






















place at a different rate to that expected." (13) The 
main part of the brewery's work was thus done as far as 
possible in daytime working hours, but the nature of 
the end product meant that there had to be some 
supervision of the processes at all times. However, 
this was kept to thé minimum possible level consistent 
with maintaining the quality of the brew for at least
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two reasons. Firstly, the working of unsocial hours did 
attract higher wages. To remain cost effective, the
management would wish to restrict these to the bare
minimum. Secondly, this was reinforced by the moral 
ethos of the company's nineteenth century traditions 
which had encouraged limitations on working hours. T.F. 
Buxton, at the start of the nineteenth century had
enforced a strict Sunday observance, whilst in the
1880s, the partners had been at the forefront of a 
campaign to obtain half-day Saturday working. Thus, for 
both practical and familial reasons, there was a 
commitment to keep unsocial working hours to a 
minimum.
Fermentation took about one week in all. 
Approximately twenty-four hours after it had started, a 
light frothy head would appear. This would be allowed 
to fall over the top of the fermentation squares where 
it was collected and could subsequently be re-used. A 
more vigorous fermentation then ensued, this time being 
skimmed off by boards run across the tops of the 
squares. The brew would then be dropped into a 
cleansing tank where fermentation continued until a 
stable end-product had been effected. In the course of 
this process, carbon dioxide gas would be given off, 
and this would be collected under copper domes hung 
over the fermentation squares. This gas would be sucked 
into containers and pumped to the Bottling Stores where 
it would be used in the carbonation process. At this
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point the beer itself had been produced and was now 
readÿ for the next stage in its progress - its 
packaging, either as keg beer or as bottled beer.
It seems probable that Trumans followed the 
practice of other London breweries, identified by 
Hugh-Jones in the New Survey of London Life and Labour 
of dividing its operative brewers into three shifts, 
each shift consisting of two men. (14) This did not 
necessarily mean that there would be an operative 
brewer on the site; it was quite possible that they 
were simply on emergency call, to be called in in the 
event of a problem. It was part of their conditions of 
service that they lived adjacent to the brewery, in 
company-provided accomodation, should they wish it. It 
was the Foreman who generally supervised the actual 
process of brewing, calling upon the operative brewer 
if faced with problems that were beyond their 
competence. They would have gained their knowledge and 
experience in on-the-job training, and their promotion 
would have been a reward for hard work, ability and 
reliability. A typical career pattern would have been 
one such as that experienced by this employee:
Year Position Weekly wage
1872 Began in Ale Tun Room as 'odd
man' aged twenty-one £1-01-0
1898 Assistant Foreman £1-12-0




This man was pensioned off in the same year that he was 
made up to Foreman. By that time, he had savings of £94 
in the Savings Bank, he owned £200 worth of War Bonds 
and his own house. This then was the path of a 
successful member of the workforce, but it was not an 
avenue open to all. The number of men who worked in the 
brewery made this a progression that was only available 
to a small percentage of the labour force.
To summarise then, the majority of work that was 
carried out by the brewers was unskilled, heavy labour: 
"Physical strength rather than skill is required of 
brewers' men." (16) The sort of work that they were 
engaged upon included the cleaning of tuns and vats, 
moving beer from one area of operations to another, 
adding ingredients to the brew under supervision and, 
on occasions, moving into the next phase of the process 
and helping in the cellars. As has already been 
indicated, individual labourers who took on what were 
considered to be 'responsible' duties were likely to be 
paid a supplement to the basic rate that all labourers 
earned. Once a worker had been allocated an area of 
responsibility, the pattern seems to have been for him 
to continue to fulfill that task for the duration of 
his employment with the company. Thus, where the 
workers had a perception of themselves as being 
semi-skilled, it was derived from constant repetition 
rather than through the acquisition of a skill or 
through specialist training. This pattern was one that
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dated back into the nineteenth century, for as Barnard 
had noted when he visited Trumans: "two or three of the 
mash men to whom we were speaking stated that they had 
been in the same occupation for the firm over forty 
years and they were by no means either the eldest or 
the longest in service." (17) That this pattern 
persisted into the twentieth century is clear from a 
perusal of the wage books. Over long periods of time 
the same individual would receive additional payments 
for their responsibility in carrying out the same task. 
Thus, an internal job ladder existed that because of 
its industry-specific nature acted as a mechanism for 
retaining those labourers who had been identified as 
able and reliable.
Most of the labourers in this and other 
departments began as 'odd' men, that is as temporary 
labour. Although the demand for labour within a brewery 
was likely to remain fairly constant, it could be 
affected either by the changing state of the trade or 
by seasonal changes in demand. By retaining part of the 
workforce on a temporary basis, these would be among 
the first to be laid off should the need arise. In 
1920, when the wage records showed whether members of 
the department were permanent or temporary, 42 per cent 
(thirty-one out of a total workforce of seventy-three) 
were recorded as 'odd' men, although of these, 
twenty-three had been continuously employed by the 
company for more than a year and the remainder had come
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into the company's employ when it took over the Kilburn 
Brewery. It is impossible to draw any firm conclusions 
about this situation or to draw any comparisons with 
other years as this was the only occasion when the 
classifications were made explicit. It does, however, 
show that temporary did not necessarily mean 
short-term, and suggests that this group were always 
likely to be a significant element in this department, 
with its emphasis on physical rather than skilled work 
and its immediate sensitivity to any changes in demand. 
In terms of renumeration, these 'odd' men would receive 
the same basic wages as the permanent men, the same 
additional payments for extra work and would be 
entitled to a range of the welfare benefits that were 
on offer. If they remained long enough in the company's 
employ, they tended to be automatically made up to 
permanent workers, although the time scale on this 
depended on the state of trade and the rate of labour 
turn-over.
13 8
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VI
1. Directors' Minute Books. 4th January, 1912
2. C.R. Littler, The Development of the Labour Process
in Capitalist Societv. London, 1982, p.15
3. Information derived from various materials held at
the GLC
4. L. Hannah, Inventing Retirement. Cambridge, 1986, 
p.7
5. The Operative Brewers Directorv 1927 - 28. 24
6. W.H. Bird, A History of the Institute of Brewing. 
London, 1955, p.24
7. Information derived from various wage materials
stored at the GLC
8. Monthly Reports 1908 - 38. 23rd September, 1909
9. New Survey of London Life and Labour, volume V,
London, 1933, p.83
10. M. Rose, The East End of London. London, 1951, p.47
11. Black Eagle. July 1932, 4 - 5
12. Smith's Directors' Order Book. 26th May, 1920 and 
11th June, 1920
13. Charles Booth, Life and Labour of the People of 
London. Series 2, volume 3, London, 1903, p.121
14. New Survey of London Life and Labour, p.85
15. Information derived from Brewers' Men Wage 
materials, GLC
16. Charles Booth, o p . cit.. p.123
17. A. Barnard, Noted Breweries of Great Britain and 
Ireland. London. 1888, p.191
139
CHAPTER VII - PACKAGING THE PRODUCT 
, The fairly bright product that had now been 
stored in the cleansing tanks would move forward in one 
of two ways. It would either be put into a barrel or it 
would be bottled. This chapter will be concerned with 
an examination of those who were involved in both of 
these processes.
If the beer were to be delivered to a customer in 
a barrel, it would be pumped into a racking square 
after a further three to four days in the cleansing 
tank, where any excess sediment would be removed. 
Generally, this work would be carried out by labourers 
from the Brewers' department, but it was regarded as so 
responsible that in 1927 it attracted an additional ten 
shillings per week payment for those who were employed 
in doing it. In the cellars, the beer would be racked 
into casks and then stored until its sale. Until the 
1920s, ale would be racked in Number 10 cellar and 
porter in Number 18 cellar. In this decade, a 
rebuilding programme resulted in the integration of all 
racking into one set of cellars. Until 1909, the 
racking process was time-consuming and labour 
intensive: the finings were added by a hand pump which 
required four men to operate it. A hose then had to be 
attached and operated by hand in order to rack the beer 
from one cask to another. From 1909, these processes 
were semi-mechanised, enabling one man to fill up to 
nine barrels simultaneously. This change appeared to be
140
viewed positively by the workforce. When L. Cooper, a 
cellarman at Whitbreads, was put to work on the machine 
at that brewery after the Great War, he perceived it as 
a promotion from his previous work as a stower (the man 
in charge of marshalling the casks at the appropriate 
delivery point in the cellar), which in turn had been a 
promotion from his first job of simply moving the casks 
around. (1)
As far as Trumans is concerned, the wage books 
give a very detailed breakdown of the various
activities that were carried out by individual members 
of the Cellars department during 1936. Eighteen of the 
twenty-eight members of the department had identifiable 
functions, a survey of which will give some impression 
of the diversity of work which was carried out here. 
The Foreman earned £6 per week, a figure that was very 
nearly equal to that earned by the senior foreman in 
the Brewers department, although the latter post
involved responsibility for considerably more men and 
for more complicated processes. The likely explanation 
for this is the fact that the opportunities for theft 
in the Cellars were greater than in the Brewers. In 
order to minimise this risk, those who were employed 
here were rewarded with slightly higher wages than were 
the norm. There was one worker in charge of returned 
beer earning 76 shillings per week. He was responsible 
for adding back to existing brews any beer that had 
been returned by customers because it was inadequately
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racked. The aim was obviously that this should not 
happen too frequently, so a sample room checker on a 
wage of 69 shillings per week was employed to take 
samples from various casks and check them for 
temperature, quality and clarity. There were workers in 
charge of running the beers into the cellars (74 
shillings per week), cleaning the cellars (65 shillings 
per week) , and even of cutting bung rags, which would 
be used to stopper the bung holes in the casks (68 
shillings per week). There were also, of course, those 
who ran the racking machines. If one examines the wage 
levels of the department, it appears that their work 
seems to have experienced a downgrading in the 
hierarchy of the department in the period following the 
introduction of semi-mechanisation. By 1936, workers 
engaged in this function were earning between 65 and 66 
shillings per week, whereas some general labourers were 
earning up to 68 shillings per week, although the range 
began at 58 shillings. General labourers would be 
involved in a variety of tasks, many of which involved 
hard physical labour. They would move the casks from 
one part of the operation to another and participate in 
the constant process of washing and steam cleaning.
There was a great deal of overlap between work 
done in this department and that done in the Brewers 
department. The records show that individual workers 
were likely to move between the two areas in the course 
of their working life. Thus, for example, the workman
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who acted as Foreman of Number 18 cellar from 1907 to 
1921 Was moved to the post of junior Foreman in the 
Brewers in 1921, becoming senior Foreman in 1924. It 
was just as likely that a worker would be moved from 
the Brewers to the Cellars. Indeed, where this did 
happen, it seems probable that some form of hidden 
selection procedure was at work, in view of the 
necessity for absolute certainty about the honesty of 
those employed there. Such a move would offer the 
individual a proportionately greater opportunity for 
advancement because of the smaller numbers employed 
there. Therefore in this department too, the prospect 
of promotion via an internal job ladder was available 
to members of the labour force and would act 
functionally as a means for enhancing worker loyalty.
The barrels that were used in the cellars were 
all supplied by the company's own cooperage. The men 
who worked in this department were divided into a clear 
hierarchy of skill. At the base of that hierarchy were 
the labourers. As in other departments, they shared a 
basic work specification together with a basic wage, 
but additional duties would attract additional payments 
to their renumeration. In spite of their status, they 
provided through their labours ” a very large part of 
the cooperage operations," (2) namely the receiving and 
the washing of casks that were being returned by the 
trade. When the casks arrived back at the brewery they 
would be subjected to a rigorous sterilising procedure.
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Firstly, they would be filled with boiling water and 
left 'to stand for as long as possible to soften any 
deposits on them and make the subsequent washing 
easier. Shives and corks would then be removed and 
washing would then take place. This was done 
semi-automatically until 1922, with the labourer in 
charge of the machines earning an extra two shillings 
per week for the responsibility. In 1922, the process 
was fully mechanised when the 'Goliath' was introduced, 
enabling more efficient and sterile cleaning of the 
kegs. The labourer in charge of this not only earned an 
additional five shillings per week for the 
responsibility, but was also given an assistant on an 
extra shilling per week. This indicates that in this 
particular instance, mechanisation did not appear to 
lead to any form of deskilling, but instead created 
additional status for the labourer given this position. 
It is difficult to assess whether mechanisation had a 
profound effect on the number of jobs available in the 
cooperage. In 1920, there were thirty-four unskilled 
workers employed there. By 1936, there were thirty-one 
of whom 58.7 per cent had been employed for more than 
sixteen years. (3) It is true that the total number of 
workers employed in the brewery expanded rapidly in 
this period, but the majority of the increase was 
concerned with bottling and with services to the 
brewery and the tied trade, so there may be little 
significance in the fact that the numbers employed
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remained static.
I As a barrel progressed through the Goliath, a 
series of nozzles would emit either boiling hot water 
or steam or cold water into the interior of the cask 
via the bung hole. The machine could deal with 
something in the region of one hundred and seventy 
barrels per hour. At the end of the run, a general
labourer would be waiting whose task it was to scrub
off any earlier brew or destination marks. The casks 
would then be placed on drying and cooling nozzles 
through which pure filtered air would be driven under 
pressure. Once each barrel had been sterilised in this
way, it would be passed onto a labourer known as a
'smeller' who would put his nose to the bung hole in 
order to smell the interior. If he detected any unusual 
smell, he would resubmit the barrel for a further 
washing. Once the smeller had passed the barrel it 
would once more be filled with hot water and allowed to 
stand before being passed on to the 'pricker'. He would 
put a rod through the tap hole, moving it around within 
the cask to determine whether all the debris had been 
removed. Like the smeller, if he were not satisfied 
with what he found, he would resubmit the barrel for 
further washing and sterilisation. All these labourers, 
together with others who were employed in the cooperage 
to move barrels around both within the cooperage and 
back to the cellars, were unskilled. Like the men who 
worked elsewhere in the brewery, they were initially
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taken on as 'odd' men and later made permanent. They 
might' pick up the knack of doing certain tasks quickly 
and easily and they might find themselves additionally 
recompensed for this, but they could not be regarded as 
having acquired a skill in a traditional sense.
Further, apart from the additional payments that were 
made for the specific tasks identified above, there was 
no real opportunity for promotion of the type afforded 
in other departments of the brewery. Yet in spite of
this, the length of service of those employed in this
department was high, as table V illustrates, with 74 
per cent of the unskilled labourers in the department 
having served at least ten years.
Table V - Length of service by labourers in the
Cooperage, 1936
1 2 years 1
3 - 5 years 2
6 - 10 years 7
11 - 15 years 4
16 - 20 years 6
21 - 25 years 4
26 - 30 years 2
31 - 35 years 2
36 - 40 years 2
41 - 45 years 1 (4)
It is clear that this degree of loyalty was not 
achieved through internal job ladders as they were non 
existent in this department. The only apparant
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variable between the Cooperage and the Brewers 
departments was a three shilling per week (68 to 65 
shillings) differential in terms of basic wages in 
favour of those employed in the cooperage. This raises 
interesting questions. Whilst it may be the factor that 
ensured loyalty among the cooperage labourers, it might 
have been expected to cause conflict amongst those 
labourers for whom it was not available and who were 
not experiencing success on the internal job ladders. 
This apparant lack of conflict may therefore possibly 
be regarded as the consequence of the welfare practices 
successfully engendering the loyalty of the majority of 
the labour force and minimising the need for conflict.
When the cask had been satisfactorily sterilised 
it would be examined by a trimming cooper to see if it 
required any repairs. Should any be needed, he would 
obtain the necessary materials and carry out that 
repair. None of the available sources identify the 
training that these men had in order to carry out the 
work, but as every one of them was in their 
mid-twenties or older when employed by the company, one 
can only assume that they had received some sort of 
craft or apprentice training elsewhere. They received a 
flat wage rate, which unsurprisingly was considerably 
in excess of that of the general labourer; in 1936, for 
example, the trimming coopers were earning more than £4 
per week, whilst most of the labourers in the cooperage 
were earning a basic rate of 68 shillings.
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One step above the trimming coopers in the 
hierarchy were the slightly more numerous shop coopers. 
These had certainly received a full seven year 
apprenticeship, as several of them had received their 
training in the Trumans cooperage. Others had worked 
their way through the ranks of the trimming coopers at 
the company to be finally made up to shop coopers, 
whilst a third group were directly employed from 
elsewhere, presumably when the first two groups 
provided insufficient numbers. In contrast to the 
trimming coopers, the shop coopers were members of a 
craft society. The work of this group was to make new 
barrels. Unusually for the brewery trade, they were 
supplied by a sawyer who was actually employed at the 
site, providing a fourth level within the hierarchy, 
somewhere between the general labourers and the 
trimming coopers. The shop coopers were paid on a piece 
rate basis that was linked to the prevailing craft 
rate. The wage books do not give the piece rate, but 
summarise the average weekly earnings of each cooper, 
which for most was significantly higher than the 
trimming coopers. In 1936, all earned more than the 
trimming coopers, with only one earning less than £5 
per week and the maximum being £6. It was from amongst 
the ranks of the coopers, whether they be trimming or 
shop coopers that the Foremen for this department came. 
There was a senior Foreman who took overall 
responsibility for the entire department, aided by an
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under Foreman who was responsible specifically for the 
work 'of the labourers and a deputy Foreman whose remit
was the work being undertaken by the skilled men. It
was very unlikely that someone who had not held one of
the two junior posts would be promoted to the senior
post. In the inter-war period both of the men who 
successively held the post had been in the employment 
of the company for a considerable period of time; the 
first for seventeen years and the second for twenty—two 
years. There was thus a clear" division in the 
department with the skilled men having access to a 
promotion ladder that was unavailable to the unskilled 
men.
Whilst primitive forms of bottling had gone on 
since 1889 at Coverley Fields, a five and a quarter 
acre site that was located some quarter of a mile from 
the Brick Lane brewery in Whitechapel, it was not until 
1897 that chilled and filtered beer to be sold in a 
bottle was produced at the brewery. Yet within a very 
short space of time, the Bottling department was to 
grow to be one of the largest departments in terms of 
the number of people it employed and its output was to 
become a significant element in the trade of the 
company. It was suggested in 1933 that the bottled 
trade amounted to one-third of the brewing industry's 
trade in London. (5) It was also said to be significant 
in the sense that it brought about a fundamental change 
in the structure of the workforce by the introduction
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of women onto the shop floor.
, In the early years, the approach of the company 
to the production and marketing of this new product was 
tentative. Little Investment was made, with the 
department comrising "more or less of Mr. Harry Buxton, 
Mr. Browne, a couple of girls, an old syphon filler and 
a gross or two of screw pints." (6) This reinforces the 
point made earlier about the role of management. A 
member of the Board was directly and explicitly 
associated with the department, implying that a 
considerable amount of time was spent there. The 
experience of the Bottling department also reinforces 
earlier remarks about the company's cautious approach 
to change. Bottling work was initially carried on at 
Brick Lane and Coverley Fields and comprised merely of 
the bottling process itself, with the beer being 
brewed at Burton. More than a decade after their entry 
into this market, production remained low. Changes that 
were initiated from 1908 were to provide the foundation 
for the expansion of the department. In August 1908, 
new bottling stores were opened at Tottenham and 
following this production levels did begin to rise: in 
December 1908, one hundred and twenty barrels in quarts 
had been produced for the tied trade; by March 1910 
this figure stood at seven hundred. This growth led to 
the creation of a new clerical post with specific 
responsibility for bottled beers in the tied trade 
where previously such work had been carried out as an
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adjunct by a clerk with more general duties. By the 
end of 1910, in addition to the three sites already 
mentioned, bottling in the London area was also going 
on at Brixton, Chiswick and Ilford, with provincial 
depots at Birkenhead, Newcastle and Swansea. Such 
decentralisation arose from managerial policy, for it 
reduced transport costs and would ultimately lead to 
greater economic efficiency. In the early years the 
department was running at a loss, for having decided to 
invest in a number of depots, capital and building 
costs had to be recouped. However, the losses of 
£5,500 in 1914 had turned to a profit of just over 
£2,500 by 1915, (7) and on every other occasion that 
the Bottling department is mentioned in the Directors' 
Minute Books, it is to record a substantial profit 
margin.
There do exist some records for those employed at 
depots other than Brick Lane, but they tend to be 
rather patchy. Furthermore, all other aspects of this 
study tend to have focused on Brick Lane. Therefore, 
most of the remarks that follow will continue this 
practice. There arose a considerable increase in the 
demand for bottled beers in the period following the 
end of the war which could not be met exclusively from 
the beer being produced at Burton. Some of the brewing 
was therefore taken over by Brick I^ne. Such an 
increase in demand meant that there also had to be a 
simultaneous increase in brewing, bottling and
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distribution capacity. At Brick Lane, this increase was 
to be achieved, in two principal ways: through a
building programme and through technical development.
Alteration and building work was a continuous 
feature of the period. It began in 1916, when women 
were first employed on the Brick Lane site, thus 
necessitating modifications to toilet and washing 
facilities. By 1932, Number 19 store had been converted 
to bottling and a new bottling stores factory had been 
opened. These physical changes meant that the various 
advances that were being made in the mechanisation of 
the production of bottled beer in response to the 
growing consumer demand for the product could be 
introduced into the brewery. When bottling had first 
begun at Brick Lane, the processes involved in the 
washing, filling and stoppering of the bottles had 
largely been carried out by hand. The treatment of the 
beerin the bottles had been determined by a Foreman who 
had been brought into the new department from the 
Brewers; "the amount of carbonation in each bottle was 
left to the discretion of the Foreman in charge and 
depended on such factors as the weather." (8) By 1929, 
however, it was possible for a visiting journalist to 
remark that "they have laid down a magnificent 
automatic bottling plant, equipped with the latest 
machinery." (9) The impact of mechanisation was 
dramatic; before it had taken place "it cost a brewery, 
on average, two and a half pence to bottle a dozen
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bottles; after mechanisation the cost fell to a 
halfpenny." (10) It was possible to pass at least a
part of this saving on to the consumer, and in the
process to generate even more demand for the product. 
Table VI - Numbers employed in Bottling 1914 - 36
1914 1920 1936
Men 93 56 124(+93 delivery)
Women 51 42 119
Total 144 98 233
(11)
The increasing demand for bottled beer was 
clearly reflected by the growing numbers of people 
employed in the department. The rate of this growth was 
not matched by any other department (see Appendix I).
It can also be seen from the figures that the picture
was not one of uninterrupted growth. The explanation 
for this seem to lie in the general state of trade at 
that time. Faced with a slack period in 1920, the 
brewery responded by laying off workers. Bottling was 
particularly sensitive to such economic fluctuations 
according to one contemporary source because "as these 
workers are not skilled, there is no pressure on a firm 
to retain them during a slack time and changes in 
demand therefore have more effect on employment by 
bottlers than brewers." (12) It is difficult to assess 
how accurate this conclusion is. It is true that 
bottling did not require skill, but then neither did 
other tasks carried out by general labourers within the 
brewery. It has already been indicated that any "skill"
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that was acquired was job and industry-specific. It 
has also been indicated that in certain departments, 
'odd' men were specifically employed in order to have a 
buffer of labourers who would be the first to be laid 
off in a recession.
What was identifiably different about Bottling 
was the age structure of its male employees, although 
again 1920 does not conform to the general trend, 
presumably because of the impact of the war.
Table VII - Age structure of men employed in Bottling 
by percentage
1914 1920 1936
Under 21 61.3 28.6 52.6
Under 25 63.4 51.8 67.3
Under 30 73 64.3 74.6
(13)
What the material implies is that the nature of the 
work that was carried out by the boys and men in this 
department required little of the "skill" in the sense 
that the word has been used with regard to brewing. 
Additionally, no boy was ever made permanent, but had 
to wait until the age of twenty-one. Therefore, those 
employed in this department would be vulnerable to 
shifts in the economy.
By 193 6, the substantial number of men who were 
employed in bottling had been divided into two groups. 
There were those who were employed in the Factory and
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those who were employed on deliveries that, were 
specifically connected with the bottled trade. Both 
sections employed a large number of boys in unskilled 
work. At the age of twenty-one, a boy would be 
interviewed and a decision would be made as to whether 
to offer them a permanent job. For instance, had a boy 
been taken on in the delivery section as a vanboy, he 
might hope to be engaged as a junior carman at 
twenty-one, being advanced to carman at twenty-four. In 
the first instance, the boys would be interviewed by 
Jeacock in his capacity as Works Manager, but the final 
decision lay with the Board of Directors and would be 
closely linked to the state of trade at the time a boy 
reached his majority. In 1932, for instance, Jeacock 
referred back to the Board the cases of sixteen boys 
for whom no adult jobs were currently available and 
recommended that any decision should be deferred for a 
further six weeks. (14) It therefore appears that 
although workers in bottling were likely to be among 
the first to be laid off in trade recessions, the mere 
fact of transition from boy to adult did not
automatically lead to a lay-off designed to save the 
cost of an adult wage.
The more precarious nature of the Bottling
department is clearly indicated by a comparison of the 
length of service of its labour force with that of the 
Brewers department, (see graphs I, II and III) Although 
those who were employed in Bottling would receive the
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Graph ï - A comparison of length of service of men employed
in Bottling and Brewing, 1914
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Graph 1% - A comparison of length of service of men employed
in Bottling and Brewing, 1920
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same benefits as those employed elsewhere in the 
brewery, by themselves they were clearly insufficient 
compensation for the failure to provide other key 
variables that were generally available to men working 
in other parts of the brewery. These were a reasonable 
degree of job security and the existence of an 
effective internal job ladder to provide opportunities 
for promotion.
Whilst it is true that employment in the Bottling 
department did not necessarily mean employment in the 
same task over the years, there is no indication that 
movement from task to task was related to any type of 
skills or status hierarchy. Rather, it appears merely 
to be a mechanism to meet the company's specific needs 
at a specific time. It is true that it was possible for 
a man who remained with the company to make some 
progress within the department, presumably because the 
turn-over rate was so much higher than in other parts 
of the brewery. Most men would begin in some form of 
general labouring and might then take on additional 
responsibilities over time, for which they could earn a 
few shillings a week on top of their basic wage. The 
workforce, for instance, was divided into a number of 
gangs and each of these would have its own leading 
hand. Thus, advancement might come, although it could 
be slow in the process, as the career of J. Segust 
demonstrated:
1909: Joined the Bottling Store, aged fifteen
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19X1: Moved to Cold Stores 
1919:' Deputy Foreman, Cold Stores 
1940: Foreman, Cold Stores
1950: Relinquished post and put in charge of Ships
Store and Export Beer stocks
(15)
The women employed in Bottling were engaged 
exclusively on the processes of bottle washing, 
filling, stoppering and labelling. Their position 
within the workforce was low grade and low paid. In 
1914, boys working in the Bottling department were 
earning the same basic wage as women, although the gap 
did widen marginally in favour of women after the war. 
However, any opportunity for advancement by a woman 
worker was actually reduced by the time that war came 
to an end. In 1914, it was recorded in the wages 
materials that payments were being made to a Forewoman 
and an Assistant Forewoman. Although it is not shown 
whence they came, it seems probable that they had been 
promoted from within the women's labour force. At some 
point during the war, the way in which the department 
was organised was modified, so that the women came 
under the control of a Foreman. Although a woman 
Welfare Worker was brought in to look after the 
interests of the women, she was a member of the 
clerical staff and not promoted from the shop floor.
The women earned a uniform rate of pay with the 
possibility of an additional payment, generally in the 
region of two shillings per week if they worked on a
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specific machine or undertook a specific task. That
I
such conditions of employment did not engender the same
Table VIII - Percentage of workers with more than six 
years service in Bottling 1914 and 1920
1914 1920
Men 34.5 57.2
Women 13.7 4.8 (16)
degree of company loyalty that was evident amongst a 
significant part of the male workforce is indicated by 
the fact that the brewery clearly did not retain the 
women during the war, when other forms of better 
renumerated employment were available. It should, of 
course, be remembered that the men indicated in the 
table might well have been fighting in the war, but 
would have continued to clock up years of service while 
they were away. It may be that this problem of keeping 
women workers was one of the factors that encouraged 
the Board to meet with representatives of the Brewers' 
Workers Union in August 1919 and to agree with them, 
inter alia, that women who were employed in bottling 
should have a five shilling per week pay rise. This 
improvement in wages clearly had a long-term beneficial 
effect on the company's ability to retain its women 
workers, for by 1936, 30.3 per cent of women workers in 
the department had more than six years service. 
Nonetheless, there was always a relatively high rate of
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turnover, for women had to stop work on marriage. Thus, 
also 'in 1936, 35.3 per cent of the women had been
employed for less than a year.
In many key respects then, bottling was different 
to other departments within the brewery. It employed 
large numbers of women; the age structure and length of 
service of its male workforce were both considerably 
lower than those of other departments; it lacked a 
clear internal job ladder and this was not compensated 
for by marginally higher wages, as was the case in the 
cooperage. It is not clear why this department should 
be so different. It was of course a completely new 
department and this may suggest that in some respects 
the behaviour of management may have undergone a 
modification when not constrained by the traditions of 
the past. Equally, as has been indicated, the new 
department did develop on a rather ad hoc basis in its 
early days and its different circumstances may merely 
be a reflection of this. As with so many other key 
issues, the answers are not to be found in the recorded 
discussions of the Directors. This seems to imply the 
latter, for the former would have involved a conscious
change of strategy, which it seems probable would have 
been discussed at Board level.
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CHAPTER VIII - DISTRIBUTING THE PRODUCT AND OTHER 
r WORK AT THE BREWERY
I - Distribution 
As has already been indicated, by 1936 the 
Bottling department had its own delivery service. In 
addition to this, there were the drays, which were 
responsible for the movement of barreled beer. Before 
the First World War, acting in support of the drays 
there existed the stables. These continued their 
existence post-war, but within the Works department a 
group of workers who were designated at various times 
as either motors or transport were created in order to 
service deliveries, whether they be of bottled beer or 
of cask beer. An attempt will be made to examine each 
of these elements discretely, but of necessity there 
will be some degree of overlap.
The drays had their own separate and prestigious 
culture within the brewery, although it is clear that 
this did experience some modification between 1914 and 
1920. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
draymen were perceived as a breed apart, as is 
suggested in an inter-war article in the 'Kent 
Reporter' which bemoaned the loss of this traditional 
stereotype;
Men and women wondered at his prestigious 
girth and marvelled at his phenomenal strength 
.... He was indeed a sight to be wondered at..
.. He turned the scales, generally somewhere
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between fifteen and twenty stone.... Probably 
bn average, he consumed one pint of beer for 
every hour of the day he was on the road....
An honest, kindly, hardworking fellow.... (1)
That the burden of work that they carried out was 
extremely hard was transparently true. Their horses 
left the stables at 4.30am, and the drayman would face 
a fine of one shilling if he were not present for his 
name call at that time. The drays would then be loaded 
in one of three loactions, dependent on the type of 
beer that was to be delivered. The working day would 
not be completed until all the beer had been delivered, 
which could be very late indeed:
Some nights from about 10.30 to midnight (and 
I have known it to be later), drays could be 
seen standing in Brick Lane as far down as 
Hanbury Street on one side and below the Two 
Brewers on the other side, waiting their turn 
to enter the Cooperage Yard. (2)
The work was extremely heavy and carried with it a high 
degree of risk of injury and occupational disease such 
as bronchitis. Even were a man able to avoid the worst 
of this, "the nature of their lives is such that 
draymen are, as a rule, past work at between the ages 
of fifty and fifty-five." (3) For this reason, the 
department had its own Mutual Association, membership 
of which was compulsory, in order to insure against the 
various hazards associated with the job.
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In view of the nature of the work, it is not 
surprising that the renumeration was good, although the 
earnings did tend to fluctuate quite widely because 
they were calculated on the basis of a small fixed 
weekly wage to which was added 'turn' money, a piece 
work rate that was derived from the distance covered 
and the number of full casks delivered, together with 
an arbitrary addition, which had originally been based 
on the number of empty casks returned. This practice 
was to continue into the post-war period. Thus, in the 
mid 1920s, to the basic driver's wage of forty-five 
shillings was added three shillings and sixpence if he 
had covered twenty-five miles and completed a third 
journey and a further five shillings should he complete 
a fourth journey. In addition, he received one penny 
for every cask returned to the brewery. (4)
In the early 1920s, the draymen initiated an 
attempt to abandon barrel money and introduce overtime 
in its place with the support of their union. This 
proved short-lived with the union returning to the 
Board asking for barrel money to be reinstated because 
"within nine months the horse draymen lost £300 - as
this was the difference between the amount paid in 
overtime and the amount that would have been paid if 
barrel money had been accepted instead." (5) Indeed, 
the difference would have been greater had the Board 
applied the union's overtime rate of one shilling and 
threepence an hour rather than their own rate of one
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shilling and sixpence. Although the Board did not 
explicitly present their actions as a mechanism for 
undermining union support, it seems likely that this 
might have been an anticipated outcome.
Although the nineteenth century system of payment 
worked to the benefit of those who worked on the horse 
drays, it also worked to the benefit of the company 
when applied to those who were employed on the motor 
drays because: "if a driver's magneto, carburettor or
plugs or anything else goes wrong (which should be put 
right by him) and so delays him, he gets no extra 
pay and as a consequence we are never worried by the 
thought that the men are wasting time on the road. 
Extra pay is given only where a breakdown occurs over 
which the driver has no control." (6) This apparently 
less sympathetic treatment of the problems that motor 
draymen had to contend with did not appear to alter the 
relatively high status that was attached to this group 
of workers.
In the early 1920s, as the brewery moved towards 
mechanical drays, there were opportunities for those 
who wished to seize them. Jeacock, for instance, 
recorded the case of a general brewery labourer who 
spent his holiday obtaining a BSM driving certificate. 
On his return to work, he joined the motor night gang 
in order to gain the experience which subsequently 
enabled him to be made up to a driver. (7) Such an 
arrangement clearly worked to the benefit of both
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parties: it gave members of the workforce an
opportunity for improvement, but it also enabled the 
company to employ drivers from within the existing 
labour pool. It was not, however, presumably because of 
the relatively recent nature of the use of motor 
transport, always possible to achieve this. In 1919, 
when a night Foreman was required for the Motors, he 
had to be brought in from outside. This evidence 
therefore suggests that the wages paid and the 
incentives offered were sufficient both to attract men 
with experience from elsewhere and to encourage men 
within the brewery to spend time and money obtaining 
the appropriate qualifications. The management, 
apparently by default, appears to have succeeded in 
achieving the most cost effective method of wage 
payment for the immediate future, whilst having 
maintained the loyalty of the workforce by conceding 
the requests made of it.
The progression to drayman that had been 
established in the course of the nineteenth century 
followed a clear pattern. A man would begin as a 
trouncer, that is by helping to load and unload the 
drays. As his length of service advanced, he would 
anticipate being initially allowed to drive a dray as a 
fourth class drayman. As he gained more experience and 
his length of service increased still further he would 
expect to gain promotion, until he finally became a 
first class drayman. This would involve the payment of
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an ever higher basic wage. Such a route was regarded as
I
the norm and when its path was impeded could lead to 
industrial relations problems. In 1911, for example, a 
six hour strike by the drays was caused by the slowdown 
in the promotion of fourth class draymen into third 
class. The significance of the drays to the working of 
the brewery is clearly demonstrated by the short 
duration of the strike which was resolved by the 
decision of the Directors to create more dray teams, 
thus creating more opportunities for promotion through 
the classes. (8)
The twentieth century did see some improvement in 
the conditions of the draymen. Their working day had 
been shortened, so that they started at 6am. Loading 
had been speeded up both by better organisation and the 
building of new loading out stages. These were not, 
however, as has already been suggested, the most 
fundamental of the changes that had taken place in the 
department. As early as 1902, there had been a trial 
period with a motor dray, but this had not been 
successful and it had been returned to the 
manufacturer. There were further tentative experiments 
with motor vehicles, so that by the time war broke out, 
there was a regular steam vehicle service between Brick 
Lane and North Kent. On the whole though, the company 
was not very enthusiastic about the alternatives to 
horses and did not pursue them in a sustained way. What 
changed this policy was the lesson taught by the war
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that mechanical transport could be both reliable and 
efficient. Thus, in 1919, the first petrol driven dray 
was brought into operation. The reaction of the draymen 
to this new innovation was unenthusiastic. The reason 
for this was not explicitly identified, although there 
are a variety of potential explanations. It could have 
been perceived as a loss of status, as an effective 
deskilling, although the evidence already presented 
suggests that this was not the case. It is unlikely 
that money was an issue in view of the considerable 
debate on methods of payment in the early 1920s. 
Perhaps the most probable explanation is merely a 
normal resistance to changes that affect working 
practices that have been established over a long 
period. In any event, in order to implement the 
changes, the Board found that "at last a definite 
instruction had to be given and the man who was the 
youngest drayman had to go on the lorry, and as the use 
of lorries increased, the man next in rotation was 
taken." (9) Thus, by the mid 1920s, it had become 
company policy to gradually replace the horse-drawn 
drays with petrol-driven drays over a period of time.
By the end of the First World War, draymen were 
no longer divided into classes. There remained in place 
however a well-defined path which a drayman could 
follow which persisted through the various technical 
changes outlined above. On first employment, a man 
would work as a trouncer, earning the same rate as
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general labourers earned in other parts of the brewery, 
with the additional payment of barrel money.
f
Eventually, he could aspire to employment as a team 
driver. In 1936, for every two trouncers employed in 
the drays, there was one team driver. Of the sixteen 
team drivers, eleven had been employed by the brewery 
before their twenty-first birthday, and the remaining 
five were all taken on in their twenties. This suggests 
that trouncers with reasonable amounts of service had a 
fair expectation that at some point in their career 
they might become a team driver. Using the evidence of 
1936, it is worth pointing out that this process could 
be a very long one indeed. The minimum length of 
service of the team drivers employed in 1936 was 
twenty-five years, and some trouncers had longer 
service than that. Thus, a nineteenth century job 
ladder was replaced by an alternative one which removed 
some of the intermediate grades. In light of the long 
periods of service of the men in the department, it is 
clear that whether the various strategies being used by 
the management were conscious or not, they achieved the 
functional purpose of ensuring the long-term loyalty of 
this particular group of workers in a period when the 
fundamental nature of the work that they were engaged 
upon was in the process of change.
In the period before the First World War, the 
drays were supported in their work by the stables. Men 
working in this department had to be up with the horses
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ready before the day's deliveries began and to remain 
until I the last dray returned and had been unloaded at 
night. The basic wage compared unfavourably with that 
earned elsewhere in the brewery, but additional 
payments for overtime working, weekend working and
special responsibilities brought the take-home pay up 
to a level that was comparable to that being earned by 
those workers who had some degree of skill, such as 
coopers. It would appear that the conditions of service 
were acceptable to the men for even by the brewery's 
standards, there was a remarkably low turnover of 
workers. In 1914, twenty-three of the twenty-eight
employed in the stables had more than ten years
service, while in 1920, of the twenty-two employees, 
twenty had more than ten years of service.
By 1920, it was clear that the fundamental
changes that were taking place in the drays would also 
have profound implications for the stables. The slight 
fall in the number of employees identified as taking 
place between 1914 and 1920 accelerated considerably so 
that by 1936 there were only eight employees left. The 
principal way in which this reduction in numbers was 
effected was through retirement. In order to achieve 
this, men might be retired earlier than was the norm; 
the Foreman farrier, for example, was retired in 1921 
at the age of sixty. In order to complete the reduction 
in numbers, there did have to be some dismissals, but 
the company did try to find alternative work for these
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men elsewhere in the brewery. In 1921, of the five men 
'dismissed', four were re-employed in other 
departments. Such a clear expression of concern for the 
future of the men would doubtless operate to reinforce 
the view that all those who were associated with the 
company were part of a family, sharing concerns about 
the welfare of each individual member. Whether this was 
a conscious strategy or merely a genuine concern is not 
explicitly addressed in the source materials.
Table IX - Grades within the Stables 1914 - 36
1914 1920 1936
Foreman 1 1 1
Deputy Foreman 1 1 1
Horsekeeper 19 14 { 6 (but
Farrier 5 3 ( exact
Saddler 1 1 ( work not
Harness cleaner 1 2 { identified)
Total 28 22 8
(10)
The decline in the numbers employed in the 
stables had a direct impact on the type of work that 
was done. Before 1920, there were a number of specific 
tasks that were engaged in by specific workers who 
received additional payments for the work, such as 
chaff cutters, farriers, saddlers and harness cleaners. 
By 1936, there was only one classification other the 
Foreman, which was that of horsekeeper. No indication 
is given of specific duties, although it is fairly 
clear that the virtual obliteration of this department
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was well advanced.
The corollary to the contraction of the stables 
was the expansion of the Motor Transport department. In 
1914, this had not even existed. When motor vehicles 
had been required by the company, they had been hired 
as part of the experimentation procedures. By 1920, the 
department was employing forty-five men and by 1936 it 
had grown to eighty-three. Much of it was located in 
areas where the stables had been hitherto, although by 
1936 even this did not prove adequate to meet all its 
storage needs, so the Board began to examine the 
possibility of purchasing property from the City of 
London Corporation, (11) From the end of the war, there 
does appear to have been considerable flexibility in 
the movement of men between the three departments of 
drays, transport and bottling deliveries as a matter of 
routine. Men would tend to acquire their experience of 
motors in transport, where they would be employed on 
some of the maintenance and would be required to move 
the vehicles around the site. They might then hope to 
achieve promotion to driver's mate and ultimately 
driver. The opportunities, initially at least, were 
greater in the bottling deliveries as this went over to 
mechanical deliveries in a more complete way and at an 
earlier stage than the drays, as there were no existing 
employment structures to be modified.
There was one further possible element in the 
transportation of the product, and that was provided by
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the wharf. This had been opened at Mapping in 1841 to
f
facilitate the movement of the raw materials required 
for brewing, such as hops and malt from Kent, Essex and 
Suffolk, and for the movement of beer, both by barge 
direct to Chatham and later Colchester for onward 
distribution and by dumb barges to steamers in the
Thames by which it would be conveyed to other English 
and foreign ports. The wharf was not used exclusively 
for products pertaining to the brewery, but also 
operated as a public wharfinger. With the development 
of motor transport, much of its contract work 
disappeared and even the journey to Chatham could be
more cheaply and conveniently effected by the use of 
vans. Therefore in 1931, the wharf was shut, with its 
workers being given the option of re-employment at
Brick Lane. The numbers employed had never been large - 
ten before the war and eight afterwards, but what all 
the men had in common was that they had gone to the 
wharf after a reasonable period of employment at Brick 
Lane, during which time they had no doubt demonstrated 
the sense of honesty that was so important in the 
successful running of a wharf. The wages being earned 
in the period prior to closure ranged from eighty
shillings for three of the men to eighty-eight 
shillings for the remaining four, with the Foreman 
earning one hundred and ten shillings. As all the men 
had similar employment histories it can only be
inferred that the difference in wages represented a
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difference in the type of work being done. What such a 
difference might have entailed it is impossible to say 
as the only direct references that are made to the 
wharf involve the costs of new buildings and new 
barges.
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II - Supporting services
Once started with his buildings, machinery, 
horses, carts, barrels, backs and vats etc, 
a London brewer will keep upon his regular 
staff a large number of men for the repair 
or further increase of his plant. Work is 
put out by all to a greater or lesser 
extent, but the larger the brewery, the 
more completely it is self-sufficient. (12)
As one of the larger London brewers, Trumans employed a 
substantial number of men within the Works department. 
In the mid 1880s, it was recorded by one visitor that 
one hundred and fifty men were employed in this 
department, (13) and by 1936 the number stood at two 
hundred and ninety-nine, although this did include the 
eighty-three men already referred to as working in the 
motors section. Appendix I provides a list of the 
various sections into which the Works was divided with 
a breakdown of the number of employees in each section. 
Much of the work of the department was carried out at 
the Coverley Fields site, where there was adequate room 
for the storage of the various raw materials that were 
used in the variety of crafts that were pursued. Some 
of this work was transferred to the Brick Lane site in 
the 1920s as the rebuilding programme there progressed.
A brief survey of some of the crafts will 
indicate the variety of work that was carried out 
in-house. The bricklayers worked both within the
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brewery and in the tied trade. The inter-war period saw 
a Substantial rebuilding programme of the brewery in 
order to facilitate the company's use of new
developments, especially with regard to bottling and 
transport. In the trade, as it has previously been 
suggested, the experiences of the war led to some
modifications in perceptions about the nature of 
licensed premises. Increasingly, brewers were concerned 
with making them more pleasant environments in order to 
attract new types of customers. The pages of 'Black 
Eagle' are full of accounts of new and altered public 
houses. This work was supported by carpenters, 
painters, plumbers and electricians. The coppersmiths 
and millwrights were engaged in producing and 
maintaining equipment for use within the brewery. The 
wheelwrights, inter alia, produced the wheels for the 
two-wheeled drays which were also manufactured 
withinthe Works department by the Motors section. Sign 
carpenters made the signs that hung outside the
company's public houses. These signs had been decorated 
and subsequently maintained by the company's sign 
painters.
A number of those who were engaged in craft 
positions had joined the company from elsewhere. In 
each of the sections referred to, there were generally 
one or two boys undergoing an apprenticeship, but this 
was never enough to keep the brewery fully supplied 
with the skilled men that were needed. The conditions
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of employment and the wages earned by the skilled men 
were -determined by the prevailing hourly rate that had 
been negotiated nationally by the relevant trade 
society. The number of permanent labourers was kept low 
as a matter of policy. This meant that in times of 
economic depression, the Works provided another 
potential source of employment for permanent men who
might otherwise have been laid off. Here they would be
employed on such tasks as the painting of the brewery 
or by supporting other labourers in unskilled work.
For the permanent labourer who was assigned to 
this department there was thus the certainty of a 
craft's negotiated hourly rate, but little prospect of 
movement through a task-related skills hierarchy to a 
more senior position. In 1920, the plumber's assistant 
was the son of the plumber. By 1936, whilst the plumber 
remained, the son, who had been refused an 
apprenticeship by the company, did not. Thus, lack of 
opportunity seems to have precipitated the younger 
man's decision to leave. The best that an unskilled 
labourer could hope for was that he would come to
Jeacock's attention as a capable worker so that he
would be transferred to an occupation elsewhere in the 
brewery where it would be possible to develop the type 
of limited skill through repetition that has been 
referred to elsewhere. That this did happen is 
apparent. Lists of boys employed in the Works 
department were maintained with remarks such as
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"Bright," "Strong, make a good carman," as well as more 
personal details about family background. (14) By 
following some of the career paths, it is possible to 
track some of these boys to other parts of the brewery.
It is clear that especially in the 
industry-specific tasks, such as the coppersmiths, the 
general tendency of most departments to long service 
existed, although it is true that all sections 
contained some men with long service. However, in view 
of the large number of men employed in the Works, the 
fact that they were clearly divided into discrete 
sections and given the established role of the craft 
societies in determining wages, it is difficult to draw 
general conclusions about the issues that have been 
addressed in relation to other departments.
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CHAPTER IE - CONCLUSIONS 
' The two principal elements of this work have 
dealt respectively with the management and the
workforce of Truman, Hanbury and Buxton. With regard to 
the former, an examination was made of the nature of 
that management. This included an exploration of the 
potential motivations of the Hanbury, Buxton and Pryor 
families; the ways in which these families directed the 
organisation of the firm, both on a long-termand a
short-term basis; and the relationship that existed
between the families and the paid management. As far as 
the workforce were concerned, by following the 
production chain of beer, the variety of work and
patterns of employment within the company were 
illustrated. Despite the great variety of occupations 
that have been examined, two principal patterns of 
employment can in fact be deduced. These two patterns 
pertain largely, but not exclusively, to the degree of 
skill which was attached to the occupation.
The first pattern of employment involved those 
with no skill of the commonly accepted type. This 
pattern was to be found in the Brewers, Cellars, 
Bottling and non-craft sections of the Cooperage and 
Works departments. Boys were always taken on in che 
first instance as temporary labour, with their position 
being reviewed once they had reached their twenty-first 
birthday (or eighteenth after 1933). Depending on the 
state of the economy or the season of the year, it was
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also quite possible for adult labour to be taken on as 
temporary labour initially too. This arose from the 
Board's reluctance to lay off any of the permanent 
workforce when trade was slack. A pool of temporary 
labourers enabled the company to deal with the peaks of 
the trade whilst simultaneously providing a buffer for 
the permanent labourers. Thus, the first hurdle for 
many employees was to cross this barrier separating 
temporary from permanent employment. This would not 
necessarily be achieved at the first jump. In 
conversation with a former employee, who preferred to 
remain anonymous, he indicated that he had first been 
taken on as a temporary labourer in Bottling in 1927, 
but was laid off again by the company after a short 
period. In that short time though, he had obviously 
made a good impression because a year later the company 
wrote to him offering him a permanent job in the 
Cellars.
Having become a permanent employee, the ordinary 
labourer would almost certainly be attached to an 
experienced man, who would train the labourer in the 
processes associated with the particular type of work 
that was undertaken in the department to which he had 
been assigned. As long as the labourer was engaged 
entirely in this type of unskilled work, he might well 
find himself being moved from department to department 
on a fairly regular basis to meet the immediate needs 
of the company within the economic constraints of the
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day. The next progression that he might hope to make 
would'be to be attached to a particular process for a 
sufficient period to achieve the status of an 
'experienced' man, who had developed a limited skill 
through repetition. This progression might occur in the 
original department to which the man had been assigned 
or might occur after a movement between departments. 
Within the context of the brewery, such a man would
frequently be regarded as semi-skilled by both the
management and other workers, although this status was 
not the result of any specific training beyond the 
constant repetition of the task. The renumeration for 
this was an additional payment made on top of the basic
labourer's rate. The additional payment would relate
specifically to the additional responsibility being 
undertaken. The nature of this would vary from 
department to department, but would most frequently 
relate to working on a particular piece of machinery or 
undertaking a particular task which could range from 
cleaning the copper to being in charge of a small gang 
of men. There could also be elements of reward in a 
slightly larger than normal Christmas bonus.
The wage records indicate that such additional 
payments were achieved by a number of longer-term 
employees. It was from this group of semi-skilled 
workers that the Foreman would be selected. The 
criteria for selection is not explicitly articulated in 
the available records, but what is clear is that the
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management were always conscious of the need to 
identify those men who at some future point might be 
promoted. Thus, in the margins of the wages books, 
there are to be found frequent references to che 
abilities of individual workers, which give clues to 
those who have been marked out for possible advancement 
in the future. The "good man" of 1927 turned into the 
supervisor of 1934. (1) Those who were so selected
though, did not necessarily want that advancement. The 
anonymous interviewee indicated that when he returned 
to the brewery after his service during the Second 
World War, he was offred the opportunity to take the 
requisite training to become a Foreman, but turned it 
down because despite the increase in basic wages, it 
would have involved the loss of the additional 
responsibility money and overtime that he earned as a 
process worker. It seems likely that this narrow 
financial gap would also have been a characteristic of 
the inter-war period.
The second pattern of employment pertained to 
those who exercised some degree of skill in the more 
traditional sense. These workers, who were employed in 
the Cooperage and the Works, could have used their 
skills to effect a transfer to an employer other than a 
brewer. To work in these areas it was necessary to have 
served an apprenticeship. There was the possibility of 
serving this within the brewery; there were generally 
one or two boys attached to every craft that was
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carried on. Again, there are no explicit criteria 
provided in the sources regarding the selection of boys 
for these apprenticeships, but there are two general 
indicators, although it is not possible to state 
whether these were used separately, together or in 
conjunction with other criteria. The first of these 
indicators was attendance at a local boys' school which 
had developed close links with thé brewery and whose 
curriculum the Board had indicated was of a type that 
would enable a boy to be suitably employed at the 
brewery. The second indicator, as revealed by an 
examination of those boys who were engaged in 
apprenticeships in the inter-war period, was some form 
of personal link to the brewery. This link was most 
commonly the employment of a father in the brewery. 
This did not mean that the father had to be employed in 
a skilled occupation; the sons of unskilled men were as 
likely to be apprenticed as the sons of skilled men. 
The key prerequisite was the reliability of the father.
Once the skill had been acquired, whatever the 
channel for it, the brewery generally paid the 
prevailing craft rate for the job. It was only very 
rarely that the brewery's rate would exceed the craft 
rate. On those occasions when it did, it is possible 
that it was part of a strategy to undercut union 
support, although such an interpretation is not 
supported by specific evidence. The rate itself might 
be calculated on an hourly basis, as was the case for
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most of those who were employed in skilled occupations 
in the Works, or it might be calculated on the basis of 
a basic rate with an element of piece work involved, as 
was the case in the Cooperage. Despite the fact that 
only the minimum rate was being paid, that 
opportunities for promotion to Foreman were fairly 
limited because of the total numbers of those employed 
in similar capacities and that many of the men had 
job-transferable skills, the indications are that most 
of the skilled workers were satisfied with their 
employment, as labour turnover was relatively low, with 
the majority of those employed staying with the company 
for long periods.
There is one group of brewery workers who do not 
fit easily into either of the two models outlined 
above, but who contain elements of both. That group of 
workers was the draymen. Their pattern of advancement, 
perhaps not unsurprisingly, was closer to that of the 
first group of workers, in that they were likely to be 
taken on initially on a temporary basis. If they 
remained with the company, they would follow a fairly 
well-established patttern of advancement to permanent 
labour to trouncer to driver's mate through various 
categories of driver to deputy Foreman to Foreman, 
acquiring some measure of skill along the way derived 
from physical strength and constant repetition. It is 
at this point that the features that characterised the 
drays begin to move closer to those of the second
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group. The skills that they used in driving the drays 
were'job-transferable in that they could be used in any 
distributive trade, although it is unlikely that 
drivers in other industries were held in such generally 
high esteem as were draymen. There is a second way, 
however, in which the drays were closer to the skilled 
men and thatis the way in which they were paid. Like 
the coopers, the draymen were paid a basic rate to 
which was added additional sums calculated on a piece 
work basis. Although this method operated to the 
benefit of the management after the introduction of 
mechanised vehicles, it was a system whose working had 
been actively encouraged by the draymen themselves with 
the support of their union.
This brief analysis should make it clear that the 
economic structure of the Esat End of London was not 
merely characterised by the desperation and despair of 
those who were engaged in the sweated and associated 
trades. There clearly existed other forms of labour 
control and Truman, Hanbury and Buxton provide a good 
example of the existence of these alternatives. It is 
to an examination of the key strategies that were 
employed by the management that attention will now be 
directed. In this way, it is hoped that the experiences 
of this particular company can be used to elucidate 
some of the current thinking about the nature of 
workplace relationships and the strategies that are 
employed by management to control those relationships.
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Trumans was typical of the sort of 
family-controlled firm engaged in the capital intensive 
production of a branded, packaged commodity that 
persisted in Britain well into the twentieth century. 
As Chandler has indicated, such companies continued to 
manage their business in the same ways as their 
predecessors: "At most food and beverage companies, the 
same families continued during the inter-war years to 
manage their enterprises in a personal manner from the 
same offices their forebears had established next to 
the original factories or process plants. Most did 
continue to expand their production facilities and to 
enlarge their marketing operations at home.... Many 
added warehouses and fleets of trucks." (2) Such 
methods achieved profitability; they were used by 
virtually every branded, packaged company that figured 
in the index of the top two hundred companies by share 
value with the exception of Levers. This does not mean 
that these methods were necessarily the most efficient, 
but as many of these companies, brewers especially, 
faced little or no foreign competition, there was 
little pressure to initiate fundamental changes of 
management technique. This makes it harder in some 
respects to evaluate the nature of workplace 
relationships at Trumans. It should be remembered that 
not only were the members of the founding families 
continuing practices that had been established by their 
predecessors, but that many of the workforce were
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second and third generation employees of the company. 
Thus, ' practices that were in use would not necessarily 
be seen as conscious strategies of labour control 
either by those implementing them or by those whom they 
affected.
This in a sense is one of the key questions that 
arises. Did the management of the company employ 
implicit strategies that were not recognised as such? 
Or was the management engaged in explicit strategies 
that it did not articulate? Gospel's notion of the 
'strategic choice' that is available to companies 
implies that the latter alternative was occurring in 
some companies and that it gave employers considerable 
flexibility insofar as it meant that the appropriate 
strategy could be implemented with the appropriate 
group at any given point in time. Gospel argues that
the lack of articulated documentation as to the
existence of such a strategy should not be taken as 
proof that the strategy did not exist. (3) It is
certainly true that the management of Trumans did, on
occasions, appear to lack a clear strategy and to be 
subject to external pressure. On numerous occasions, 
after meetings with group of workers or their 
representatives from craft societies or trade unions, 
the Board appeared to capitulate to the demands being 
made of it. However, access to the Directors' Minute 
Books shows that any concessions made were generally 
the result of long and carefully considered discussions
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at Board level. It is further true that two distinctive 
forms of worker control were apparent during the 
inter-war period, namely paternalism/welfare work for 
all workers employed in the brewery and internal labour 
markets for the unskilled workers. As in the Gospel 
model, neither of these strategies is explicitly 
recognised as a form of labour control. In order to try 
and resolve this issue, it is necessary to turn to look 
at these two strategies.
The company had been in existence for nearly two 
hundred and fifty years by the start of the twentieth 
century. In the course of that time, a considerable 
number of practices and attitudes had grown up on the 
part of both the management and the workers. Although 
the financial structure of the company had been 
modified at the end of the nineteenth century, this had 
not resulted in any profound change in the style of 
management, so that those who sat on the Board of
Directors in the inter-war period were the heirs to a 
long tradition of paternalism, service and philanthropy 
which had characterised the company since at least the
early nineteenth century. It may appear that the
origins of this tradition involved a genuine social
conscience that arose from the religious background. It 
is further clear that many members of the families felt 
a real sense of duty in continuing those practices that 
their ancestors had initiated, as the previously quoted 
letter from Noel Buxton to E.N. Buxton indicated. It
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should not be forgotten however that brewery welfare
I
existed in most brewing companies, even where they did 
not share the same background. It is therefore likely 
that during the nineteenth century, the benefits of 
paternalism in contributing to an efficient and loyal 
workforce had become apparent to various brewery 
managements. Thus, however altruistic the motives both 
for originally implementing paternalistic practices and 
subsequently maintaining them, there must have been an 
awareness of its beneficial business effects.
In the early part of the twentieth century,
notions of paternalism were developed and modified by 
the creation of the overt management strategy that was 
known as 'welfare work', which arose as part of a wider 
contemporary debate on methods of management which 
included Taylorism and scientific management. It is 
clear that the management were involved in a 
consideration of the various merits of the debate. Not 
only did they move in the same social and political 
circles as some of the leading commentators, such as 
Rowntree and Cadbury, but more solid evidence of their 
awareness can be found in some of the articles 
published in 'Black Eagle', such as Jeacock's articles 
on Works Management in 1933 and 1934, or Christine
Hanbury's article on her visit to the United States in
1931. It might also be reasonable to suppose that both
the establishment of the Works Committee and of the 
'Black Eagle' itself owed something to the influence of
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the ideas of 'welfare work'.
' Theoretically, in the British variant at least, 
it was intended that welfare work should be less 
patronising than traditional forms of paternalism. It 
was argued that the labour force should have 
foreknowledge of their entitlements and receive them as 
of right, not as the consequence of the charity of 
their employers. It is transparently clear that in a 
variety of ways this shift of attitude did not take 
place at Trumans. The mythology of the employer family 
that Joyce saw as central to nineteenth century 
paternalism, rather than diminishing after the First 
World War, was in fact becoming increasingly more 
overtly developed through mechanisms such as the sports 
day and the use of the 'Black Eagle' to record events 
in the lives of the three families, such as births, 
coming of age and marriages. Strategies associated with 
the welfare work movement that gave greater rights to 
the workers, such as a clearly laid down pension 
scheme, were ignored. Other strategies which clearly 
enabled the management to reinforce the deferential
relationship between themselves and the workforce, such 
as the limited powers of the Works Committee, were
selectively adopted. This could be seen as an explicit 
strategy that was not being articulated overtly, which 
would thus support Gospel's conclusions..
In one sense, it would come as no surprise that
in the inter-war period the Board was looking for
19 0
methods of extending their control over the workforce 
and. improving the efficiency of the company. This was a 
period of great change and development in the brewing 
industry, with the advent of bottling, with its
employment of an increasing number of women, with the 
introduction of petrol-driven vehicles and the
substantial building work that had to be undertaken in 
order to accommodate this. It was shown that although 
the welfare provisions of the company were extended to 
men and women working in these areas, in other
respects of their working lives, changes were made that 
operated to the advantage of management. In view of the 
considerable investment of capital that all the new 
developments entailed, especially given that this was a 
period that was characterised by periodic falls in 
trade, it would certainly have appeared to have been 
sound business and common sense to make use of any 
policy that would enhance the efficiency of the 
company. As Reid has pointed out, it could be that the 
motivation guiding employers had little to do with any 
overt desire to subordinate the labour force, but was 
rooted in the simple wish "to make profits under given 
economic conditions which varied from case to case." 
(4)
The non-wage benefits that were provided via the 
paternalistic/welfare work mechanism clearly achieved 
important objectives for the company. Wages were either 
marginally lower than in other comparable occupations
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or merely matched the prevailing craft rates and yet 
labour turnover was low, with many employees working 
for the company for the duration of their working 
lives. Son followed father into the brewery, and 
indeed, families can be tracked over a number of 
generations. There did exist, it is true, the types of 
problem that one would associate with an enterprise of 
this nature, such as occasional drunkeness or pilfering 
or laziness, but these are not the dominant themes that 
are found in the records. This degree of co-operation 
could not have been mere good fortune, but was clearly 
generated at least in part by the paternalistic 
practices that have been examined in the course of this 
work. In view of the longevity of the strategy, it 
seems likely that it was not only the families of the 
Board who felt a sense of duty in maintaining them, but 
that the workforce would have perceived their provision 
as an integral part of their conditions of service and 
would have resisted any attempt on the part of 
management to remove them. Such a long-term view is 
highly unlikely to have been the consequence of an 
explicit strategy, but its results would certainly have 
been welcomed by the management. Welfare provision 
therefore fulfilled certain key objective functions for 
the management.
Paternalistic practices affected all members of 
the workforce and were clearly the key to the sense of 
loyalty and co-operation that existed within it.
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However, amongst the unskilled segment of the 
workforce, an internal job ladder of the type 
identified by Littler can be seen in operation, which 
almost certainly would have operated to further 
reinforce the position of the management. As has 
already been suggested, a man taken oh by the company 
could move up through a number of levels during the 
course of his working life. He would move from 
temporary to permanent to semi-skilled status through 
task repetition to deputy Foreman to Foreman. Virtually 
all promotion through this sector took place among 
those who were already in employment with the company. 
It was a very rare occurance for a man to be brought in 
from outside to a position part way up the job ladder. 
It has been indicated in this work that advancement was 
likely to take place over a number of years, although 
it was quite possible for the potential of an 
individual worker to be identified at an early stage in 
his career. The existence of such possibilities for 
promotion within a well-established internal hierarchy 
must have acted as a strong incentive to continued 
service to unskilled workers whose only effective 
qualification was their physical strength.
This pattern of employment had pertained in the 
brewery for at least a century. It seems most likely 
that it arose as an ad hoc response to the specific 
demands of the industry rather than as an overt means 
of labour control. It is clear however, that its
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existence must have reinforced the continued use of 
paternalistic practices in contributing to a low labour 
turnover. It would have further benefitted the 
management insofar as it would have kept the costs of 
training workers for specific tasks to a minimum, thus 
improving the economic efficiency of the firm. Such 
advantages would have undoubtedly manifested themselves 
in the operation of the system over the years, so that 
by the twentieth century, like paternalism, it would be 
seen as an integral part of the operating practices of 
the brewery both by the management and by the employees 
with both sides having an interest in its continued 
existence. Indeed, as has been pointed out, when the 
draymen felt the process was not taking place swiftly 
enough in 1911, it formed the basos for strike action. 
It has been suggested that although it may be possible 
to infer that the continued practice of 
paternalism/welfare work was not being explicitly 
articulated, it was being explicitly pursued as an 
instrument of policy because of the ways in which the 
Board chose to modify it. It is not possible to draw 
similar inferences with regard to the existence of 
internal job ladders because they continued to exist 
with no substantial modifications, even when, for 
example, the drays changed from being propelled by 
horses to being motor-driven.
Managerial strategy at Trumans was thus comprised 
of two key strands - paternalism modified by some of
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the thinking that informed the welfare work debate and 
internal job ladders. Together, these strategies 
operated on the workforce to create a real sense of 
loyalty to the company which manifested itself in a low 
labour turnover in spite of slightly inferior 
renumeration. The first of these strategies clearly 
conforms to Gospel's arguments regarding 'strategic 
choice'. It was an appropriate strategy for achieving 
the objectives identified and it was economically 
viable because of the capital nature of the industry. 
It was not explicitly articulated as a strategy for 
labour control in any of the materials. This may be 
because it was such an inherent part both of the 
brewing industry and of the Hanbury and Buxton legacy 
that it did not need to be articulated. In any event, 
the modifications that arose appear merely to be the 
payment of lip service to the wider developments that 
were taking place, and for this reason appear to 
support Gospel's contention that a strategy can exist 
without being articulated. The second strategy was also 
an inherent legacy of the past, but continued 
unmodified. Although it conforms in many respects to 
Littler's model of internal job ladders, the fact that 
it cannot be determined whether this was an explicit 
strategy that is not articulated or an implicit 
strategy that was not recognised, makes it difficult to 
draw firm conclusions about it.
What is clear in respect of both the strategies
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that were employed, whether consciously or not, the 
company achieved its objectives. Thus, as Mailing
suggests, both the welfare provision and indeed the use 
of internal job ladders fulfilled functional objectives 
for the company. Individual Board members were pursuing 
a strategy that they found morally acceptable, in that 
it showed a concern for the quality of life of those 
whom they employed. Yet it was also a strategy that 
enabled the company to thrive and produce a good return 
on its capital for its shareholders. With very little 
change this remained the over-riding attitude of the 
management from at least the early nineteenth century 
right through beyond the Second World War period. It 
was an attitude that even survived the ending of the 
control of the company by the families in 1971. When 
Maxwell Joseph took it over in that year, he showed an
almost idiosyncratic commitment to considerable
autonomy for the new Board, which enabled them to 
maintain the company's long established traditions. It 
was only with his death in 1982 that Trumans was 
brought into the mainstream of Grand Metropolitan 
management and gradually forced to abandon those 
practices and attitudes that had characterised its 
organisation for the best part of two hundred years. 
Whatever the motives that underlay the strategies,
there are many who regret their passing and their 
replacement by new strategies that take little account 
of the human dimension in business,
19 6
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER IX
1. Men's Wages Books. GLC
2. A. Chandler, Scale and Scope; Dynamics of Industrial
Capitalism. Cambridge, 1990, p.367
3. H.F. Gospel, "Managerial Structure and Strategies," 
in H.F. Gospel and C.R. Littler (eds.). Managerial 
Studies and Industrial Relations. London, 1983, p.14
4. A. Reid, "The division of labour and politics in
Britain 1880 - 1920" in W.J. Mommsen and H.G. Husung,
The development of trade unionism in Great Britain and 
Germany 1880 - 1914. London, 1985, p.151
19 7
APPENDIX I
NUMBERS EMPLOYED IN 'THE BREWERY IN SAMPLE YEARS
Department 1914 1920 1936
Burton floor 5 15 10
Brewers 62 73 76
Cellars 30 33 28
Finings 2 2 2
Cooperage 48 54 55
Bottling Men 93 56 124
Women 51 42 119
Total 144 98 233
Delivery - - 93
Drays 50 70 53
Stables 28 22 8
Works Bricklayers 14 31 54
Carpenters 12 12 12
Coppersmiths 23 14 22
Millwrights 10 51 48
Motors - 45 83
Painters 2 18 -
Plumbers 1 2 2
Sign carpenters 9 10 8
Sign painters 2 8 7
Smiths 3 5 5
Watchmen 11 17 18
Wheelwrights 22 18 14
Not given 1 - -












Appendix II - UK Drink Consumption per Head, 1650 - 1914
BEER (Gallons)
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, I - ORIGINAL SOURCES
A PERSONAL DOCUMENTS 
Beer Allowances 1934 - 1945 
Bottling Stores 1913 - 1915 
Bottling 1919 - 1923 
Bottling 1934 T_194^
Bottling Stores Wages 
Brewers' Men 1908 - 1924
Clerks Salaries and Rest Expenses 1898 - 1920 
Clerks Salaries 1898 - 1932 
ClerksL Agreements 1914 - 1937
Clerks Salaries and Rest Agreements 1920 - 1936
Critchlev's Directors' Order Book
Directors' Minute_Book_JÆ98 r_19_03
Directors ' Minute, Book _liL0_3_^ _l-9O6
Directors' Minute Book 1906 - 1909
Directors' Minute_Book__i909 -^912
Directors' Minute Book 1912 - 1915
Directors' Minute Book 1915 - 1918
Directors' Minute Book 1918 - 1921
DitActQKSlJMinutKBook 1921 ":_}925 
Directors' Minute Book 1925 - 1929
Directors' Minute Book 1929 - 1932
Direstpcp' 1 9 J 2 r. 1934
Directors' Minute Book 1934 - 1937 
Dissection Books 1927 - 1933 
Draymen's Wages 1899 - 1902
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Draymen's Balances 1900 - 1916 
Draymen's Wages Summary 1901 - 1921 
Draymen's Wages Book r19041 - 1919 
Draymen 1907 - 1911 
Draymen 1907 - 1935 
Draymen's Wages 1916 - 1918
Draymen 1920 - 1935
Draymen's Wages 1936 - 1938
Draymen's Wages 1938 -.1939
Expense Book JL930 -1932 
Letters Book _19%4 -_1927 
Main Ledger 1_93_0_- 194j)
Medical Examinations 1912 - 1923 
Medical Examinations 1923 - 1930 
Medical Examinations 1930 ~ 1938 
Mens Wages Books 
Monthly Reports 1908 - 1938 
Pensions and Gratuities 1919 - 1930 
Reports A.C. Chapman 1913 - 1931 
Rest Books 1906 - 1943 
Rest Expenses Memoranda 1852 - 1952 
Savings Bank Ledgers 1908 - 1926
S_avings_Bank ledger_oJf_Half-Yearly Interest 1926 - 1935
SavingsBank Balances 1927 - 1946
Smith's Directors' Order Book
Stables wage materials
Stenhouse's Directors' Order Book
Thursday Memoranda 1915 - 25
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Valuation Books 1915 - 25
Various letters located in the Correspondence Folder 
at the GLC
Hages_Book__19JL7_- 1920 (containing Works Department 
wages)
Workmen's Presents 1910 - 1923
Workmen's Presents 1924 - 1930
Workmen's Presents 1931 - 1939
Wills of the following members of the families;
E.N. Buxton, Gerald Buxton, J.M. Hanbury, A.V. Pryor
All the above materials, with the exception of the 
Directors' Minute Books and Wills were lodged at the 
Greater London Record Office. At the time of research, 
the Directors' Minute Books were lodged at Trumans 
Brewery, Brick Lane. The Wills were located at the 
Public Record Office.
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